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GLOSSARY

Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) - "Framework for
the governance and management of Enterprise IT" (ISACA, 2014, p. 1)
Cyber Space - "The interdependent network of information technology infrastructures
that includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computers, information
or communications systems, networks and embedded processors and controllers"
³3UHVLGHQWLDO3ROLF\'LUHFWLYH33'-´, p. 2)
Generally Accepted Systems Security Principals (GASSP) - "Incorporate the consensus,
at a particular time, as to the principles, standards, conventions, and mechanisms
that information security practitioners should employ, that information processing
products should provide, and that information owners should acknowledge to
ensure the security of information and information systems" (Poore, 1996, p. 27)
Guidelines for the Management of IT Security (GMITS) - "An international standard that
lays out guidelines for information security management. Associated with
ISO/IEC standards"
Information Security - "The protection of information and information systems from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction to
provide confidentiality, integrity and availability" (McCumber, 2005, p. xxiii)
Information Security Governance - "Information security governance is a subset of
enterprise governance that provides strategic direction, ensures that objectives are
achieved, manages risks appropriately, uses organizational resources responsibly,
and monitors the success or failure of the enterprise security program" (IT
Governance Institute, 2006, p. 17)
Information Security Management - "Information security management is the process of
administering people, policies, and programs with the objective of assuring
continuity of operations while maintaining strategic alignment with the
organizational mission" (Choobineh, Dhillon, Grimaila, & Rees, 2007, p. 959)
Intrusion Detection System - "A security system that monitors computer systems and
network traffic and analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating

xi
from outside the organization and also for system misuse or attacks originating from
inside the organization" (SANS Institute, 2001, p. 4)
Managed Security Service Provider - "An [sic] managed security service provider
(MSSP) provides outsourced monitoring and management of security devices and
systems. Common services include managed firewall, intrusion detection, virtual
private network, vulnerability scanning and anti-viral services. MSSPs use highavailability security operation centers (either from their own facilities or from
other data center providers) to provide 24/7 services designed to reduce the
number of operational security personnel an enterprise needs to hire, train and
retain to maintain an acceptable security posture" ³0DQDJHG6HFXULW\6HUYLFH
Provider (MSSP) - *DUWQHU,7*ORVVDU\´, p. 1)
Project Security Management - "The deliberate and detailed management of all aspects of
security, physical and virtual, within a project. A component of risk management"
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ABSTRACT

Bott, Robert E. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. An Analysis of the Effectiveness and
Cost of Project Security Management. Major Professor: Dr. Eric Dietz.

This research analyzes the idea of managing information security risk on projects,
as well as the effectiveness and costs associated with this kind of management.
Organizations today face a myriad of security risks given their increased use of
information technology. New solutions to improve information security within
organizations large and small need to be researched and analyzed. Review of relevant
literature has determined that although organizations are managing security from the top
down, there is a lack of security management at the project level and that most project
managers and their teams rely on the organizational security measures to keep
information secure. The concept of managing security risks at the project level is not well
defined and there exists no concrete and widely accepted framework for it. This research
examines if managing security at the project level within a multi-tiered defensive strategy
can be effective and at what cost. It also seeks to determine if budgeting for security in
projects will lead to more secure project assets and products. This qualitative study uses
three sources of data to deduce conclusions and recommendations. One, literary sources,
two, subject interviews of security and project management professionals, and three, a
computerized model built to simulate a defense in depth strategy. The primary finding of
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this research is that the concept of managing information security in projects is valid, and
that doing so will lead to more secure project assets and products. This type of
management will increase the security posture of the project itself and the organization as
a whole. Recommendations are made by the researcher as to what steps a project
manager and the organization above it must take to leverage the management of
information security risks on projects.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will present an overview of the research topic, its scope, significance
and the research question. Also, this chapter will include assumptions, limitations and
delimitations.

1.1

Research Question

Given the increasing global threats to information technology (IT) infrastructure,
should project managers focus more efforts on security in a comprehensive multi-tiered
defense strategy? Would budgeting for security in projects result in more secure assets
and products?

1.2

Problem Statement

Threats to information technology (IT) assets and the information they maintain
and manage have been growing considerably over the years. Moreover, the quantity of
information stored on various systems throughout the world, and its continuous use, has
been steadily increasing. This gives threat actors, from single perpetrators to criminal
gangs all the way to nation states, many more targets to exploit. Also, the wide
dissemination of simple yet powerful remote administration tools (RAT) and other
hacker-related applications has increased the ease at which threats can exploit
vulnerabilities in many systems. Within this increasingly insecure global environment,
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there is a considerable lack of qualified security experts throughout the IT industry. New
methods and approaches must be found to maximize the security posture of organizations
while minimizing costs. One such proposed method is to place more responsibility for
managing security risks on project managers. This method will assist project managers to
identify and manage security risks specific to their projects. This will enable a more
robust security posture that will result in significantly safer project assets and a more
secure product at project completion.
The intent of this case study will be to discover if security risk management for IT
projects, within a comprehensive multi-tiered defensive strategy and budgeted for by
project managers, will yield safer project assets during execution and a safer product after
the project is concluded. Methods of inquiry will include grounded theory by collecting
data from literary sources and interviews of security professionals and project managers.
Also, data will be used to build a model for case studies to discover if the added
management of security at the project level will yield significant positive results in
security posture. The concept of study will at this point be referred to as project security
management (PSM).

1.3

Scope

Security concerns for organizations using information technology (IT) has
become a critical issue in daily operations. Both virtual and physical security must be
managed at all levels within an organization in order to secure valuable assets. In an
increasingly inter-connected world, security risks of all types are on the rise. One of the
toughest challenges facing any organization is how to plan for mitigation of security risks
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and respond to security incidents once they occur, or put more precisely, how to manage
security risks. Given these challenges, the researcher proposed the question, should
project managers focus more efforts on security in a comprehensive multi-tiered defense
strategy, and would budgeting for security result in more secure project assets and
products? The management of security risk at the project level is intended to add to the
overall security posture of an organization, in particular ones that rely on projects in order
to create or maintain market share.
With the research question defined above, it is necessary to understand the scope
under which the researcher will attempt to answer the question. The intended audience
for this research are IT project managers who manage projects of any size and type
within a larger organization. This research is also applicable to projects within smaller
organizations without large resource pools. Based on an initial inquiry, it was quickly
determined that the research focus should be at the project level and not reach into the
higher echelons of management, such as program management. The effects of security
management at the higher organizational level have been considered and will be factored
in as part of the research, in the form of a multi-tiered defensive strategy, though they are
not the focus of this study. The focus on security at the project level is due to the fact that
project managers and their teams are the primary innovators in most companies, and
often handle the most important assets, including information, within the company.

1.4

Significance

With the increased use of information technology in all areas of life, and the
steady march of globalization and interconnectivity, organizations today face daunting
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security challenges, particularly in cyberspace. Several high profile data breaches in
recent years have demonstrated the threats to organizations from many different types of
bad actors, as well as the vulnerabilities in IT systems. Companies like Target and Home
Depot have experienced attacks resulting in loss of customer information (Krebs, 2014a,
2014b). Government agencies and contractors are also vulnerable to attacks and potential
loss of valuable information. According to Krebs (2014c), several Israeli military
contractors were breached, and large quantities of critical information on their Iron Dome
missile defense shield was lost to hackers based in China. According to one report, the
cyber criminals involved are tied to the Chinese military (Mandiant, 2013), and this
certainly paints a picture of a very specific and well-funded threat to companies and
governments, with respect to their intellectual property and a nation's national security.
Most recently, celebrity actresses had their personal pictures stolen from the Apple
iCloud service, demonstrating that thieves are not just simply looking to steal financial
information or company trade secrets (Bree, 2014). Any form of information is valuable
to bad actors and can potentially be monetized.
Further, the increased use of technology and third party storage has dramatically
increased the amount of information that can be compromised. These issues have
companies attempting to find new ways to deal with security concerns, such as
automation, outsourcing their security needs, or using managed security service providers
(MSSP) to improve their security posture (Forrester Research, Inc. 2013). There is a clear
need to look at the security issues of our time and find new ways to enhance the overall
security posture of organizations. Some researchers advocate that an important area in
which to enhance information security is not technological, but rather by educating
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employees and involving leadership in a more direct way, while creating a certain culture
that reduces the internal threats from employees (Nemati & Church, 2009). This approach
recognizes that humans make mistakes or are sometimes not as well trained as they
should be, and that establishing good processes to manage will yield a better security
posture. Another, similar approach is to focus on the security of projects by creating
processes that support a project manager in managing his or her own specific security
concerns (Pruitt, 2013). These security management methods should interface well with
established project management processes, and integrate into an overall organizational
security process and add to a multi-tiered defensive strategy.
The research that will be conducted for this study is significant given the above
discussed threats and vulnerabilities. The research will determine if managing security at
the project level adds significant value to an organizational security posture, and will give
insight as to how much a project manager should budget towards security. This study will
enhance the understanding of the value of PSM within a risk management framework.
The results will allow leaders to understand the importance of managing security at the
project level within the organization.

1.5

Assumptions

Assumptions are a critical part of this study. They provide the basis for which it is
conducted and are items that could potentially adversely affect the research. The
following assumptions have been identified:
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x

There is a perceived need by IT project managers to help secure project assets and
increase the security posture of organizations by managing security at the project
level

x

There is no substitute information security management scheme, framework,
process or set of procedures or practices that answers the research question

x

There is an adequate amount of data available, gathered from literature and from
individuals in the information security and project management professions, that
allows the researcher to answer the research question

x

Review and approval of this study by committee members will be sufficient to
validate the model and the research

x

The assumption is made that if fewer successful attacks occur on projects, during
various case studies executed by the model, that this will result in more secure
project assets and products

1.6

Limitations

Limitations further refine the scope of the research by listing items that will be
covered by the study. The following limitations have been identified:
x

Due to the qualitative nature of this study, the author's bias in model design and
implementation and the selection of relevant data points is inherent throughout the
study

x

Determination of which critical security controls to implement in the model was
done through a subjective reasoning process by the researcher and is based on
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literature and input from committee members as well as information security and
project management professionals
x

The model designed uses a risk management framework and treats security issues
within an organization and a project as risks to be managed

x

The model is intended to simulate an environment with projects nested within an
organization that both have certain vulnerabilities that threats seek to exploit.

x

This research is intended to determine the validity of the concept of security
management at project level and its potential effectiveness and costs

x

This research and the associated model is intended to act as a basis for possible
further research in the area of project security management and its potential
effectiveness and costs to information security within organizations

1.7

Delimitations

Delimitations ensure the further framing of the scope of the research by listing
items that the study will not cover. The following delimitations have been identified:
x

It is not the intention of this research to develop a practical and detailed project
security management framework, under the risk management knowledge area,
that can be implemented by IT project managers

x

The study is not intended to produce detailed quantitative data on the benefits and
costs of information security management at project level

x

The study and its associated model will not result in data that is directly
applicable to the use by organizations in order to improve their information
security management at the project level
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x

The model used for the analysis is not intended to be a full-featured and generally
applicable solution that can be used by any organization without further
enhancements and modifications. It is specifically designed for the use in this
research

1.8

Chapter Summary

This chapter covered the research question, the scope, significance and the
problem statement. It also discussed the assumptions, limitations and delimitations of the
research.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

The scope of this literature review consists of several topics that add to the
relevancy of the research question. In order to properly address and build a case for the
thesis, the researcher needed to investigate articles and books on enterprise risk
management (ERM), information security (IS), information security governance (ISG),
information security management (ISM) and information technology (IT) project
management. News stories and journals regarding breaches of IT systems were also part
of the relevant literature in order to provide context to the reader and make the case for
the necessity of the research.
Given the scope and nature of the research question, there were few references
regarding managing information security at the project level. The references that were
available did not specifically address the effectiveness of such measures, or delve deep
into the topic. There was however a large quantity of materials addressing topics that
directly influence the research question and add to its legitimacy. Numerous articles
touch on the subject of the research question and suggest it to be a valid concept within
the larger framework of an organization.
Based on these findings, the researcher chose to concentrate largely on material
related to ISG and ISM and how both fit within a larger organizational risk management
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framework. Furthermore, significant materials on the concept of defense in depth were
evaluated and contribute to the understanding and validity of the research question.
Finally, references on IT project management were utilized in order to
demonstrate the need for the research question to be investigated. Articles and books
selected to be reviewed by the following literature review were chosen based on the
nature of the source and relevance to the research question, as judged by the researcher.
The resulting review was a collection of materials related to security management at the
project level and its need.

2.1

Search Areas for Literature Review

A detailed and thorough search of Purdue online libraries, Purdue e-Pubs and
Google scholar was conducted. These resources consisted of databases covering a large
variety of categories from the humanities to science, technology and engineering.
Given the topic of the research, certain databases were used more than others,
among them Academic Search Premier (EBSCO), ProQuest Research Library and
ScienceDirect. Furthermore, the researcher's committee members recommended relevant
articles and books that provided valuable information to enhance the validity of the
research. A search of websites representing professional organizations and individuals
was also conducted. These sources added critical information from the professional
domain to the already extensive research documents gathered from the academic
libraries. Finally, a search of news websites was conducted to gather current news stories
relating to the thesis topic in order to provide context and relevance to the research.
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Of the resources mentioned above, the primary means used by the researcher to
gather relevant material was a search of the databases listed. This resulted in higher
quality articles and resources, most of which are peer-reviewed or published in wellknown and respected journals. When using the above mentioned online search tools, an
assortment of keywords was used to narrow the search to relevant topics. The primary
keywords and phrases used were 'project security management', 'information security',
'information security governance', 'information security management', 'enterprise risk
management', 'information technology', 'project management', and 'IT project
management'. These key words and phrases were used separately as well as together in
various combinations, searching in the title and body of texts. These searches were
conducted exhaustively on all databases in order to retrieve as many relevant references
as possible. The researcher then further discriminated by choosing only relevant materials
based on a subjective assessment.
The articles chosen for review were obtained primarily by a number of reputable
sources. These included Communications of the Association of Information Systems,
Computers and Security, SANS Institute and the Council on Cyber Security. Also,
conference proceeding from the Association of Information Systems AMCIS proceedings,
and journal articles from the Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management were
chosen for review.
The remainder of this literature review will be devoted to the topics of
information security, information security governance, information security management,
project security management and the concept of defense in depth within an organization.
The researcher will discuss the current state of literature and thinking in security
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management at the project level, after laying out an overview of information security at
organizational level, followed by a discussion on the defense in depth concept.

2.2

Information Security Governance and Management

Before discussing the topic of project security management (PSM) and what it
entails, literature regarding IS must be reviewed. Specifically, the current state of
information security management (ISM) and information security governance (ISG) at
enterprise level must be understood in order to better position project security
management into the overall security management and governance framework within an
organization.
This section will discuss information security from a technical and a human
perspective and how policies, practices and procedures play a role in an organization's
security management and governance framework. It will also lay the foundation for the
following section by presenting information from sources on concepts and practices that
can be used for project security management. The case will be made of the importance of
IS governance and IS management to modern corporations, and how widely accepted and
understood both are to senior and middle managers in most firms. Once an understanding
exists regarding information security at organizational level, and a case has been made of
the importance of IS governance and management, a clearer picture of PSM and how it
fits into these security management systems will emerge.
According to the ISO/IEC (2014), information security is the "preservation of
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information" (p. 4). The organization further
notes that properties such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability
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can also be involved. As is evident, information security covers a vast field of topics and
affects every department and person within an organization.
Further, information has become the lifeblood of many organizations and is used
to drive most business processes, involving employees from the top to the bottom of an
organization (von Solms & von Solms, 2006). Therefore, companies have realized
importance of securing their information from a variety of threats.
2.2.1

Information Security Governance

One well established framework that is deeply connected to information security
is Information Security Governance (ISG). ISG occurs at the executive and board of
directors levels of an organization and is directly related to corporate governance (von
Solms, 2006). The author discusses ISG as being the fourth wave of IS development, predated by the ³technical wave, the management wave and the institutional wave´ S .
According to the author an increase in legal and regulatory statutes have forced top
management and board of directors to pay closer attention to the proper management of
their organization's information and its security. Von Solms (2006), makes the case that
there is a "significant relationship between corporate governance and information
security" (p. 166). The author also states that ISG ³is an integral part of corporate
governance´ (p. 167) and consists of the following points (p. 167):
x

The management and leadership commitment of the board and top management
towards good information security

x

The proper organizational structures for enforcing good information security

x

Full user awareness and commitment towards good information security
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x

The necessary policies, procedures, processes, technologies and compliance
enforcement mechanisms
Von Solms (2006) discusses the fact that IS issues cannot be solved with

technological solutions alone, an idea echoed by others (Church & Nemati, 2009; Jahner
& Krcmar, 2005; Khansa, Liginlal, & Sim, 2009) and discussed in more detail later in
this chapter. The author finishes with the idea that the maturing of the concept of ISG is
signified by the process of explicit inclusion of information security into corporate
governance. Johnston and Hale (2009) claim that ISG is an essential element of corporate
governance. The authors also mention the importance of ISG due to the fact that
information security is brought to the attention of Boards and the Chief Executive
Officers (CEOs), and that it enables firms to align business strategy with security.
According to one author, the increase dependence on IT systems throughout all
modern industries has brought about the ³criticality of information security´ S and
therefore bringing about ³the need for information security governance´ (Williams, 2001,
p. 61). Further, given the rapid change in technology, the speed at which risks emerge
and the nature of human users of information systems, security must be dealt with in a
timely and proactive manner. This reinforces the need for high level governance in order
to secure information and protect executives and board members who are increasingly
responsible for the security of corporate information (Williams, 2001).
Corriss (2010) advocates corporate governance of information security through
organizational culture. The author references the Department of Homeland Security and
its systemic culture of security woven into the fabric of the organization. According to
Corriss (2010), this influence on culture is created from the top leadership positions, such

15
as the CEO, and security professionals in these firms can take advantage of this by
advocating a culture of security. This evidence demonstrates again how ISG plays an
important role in information security for enterprises by governing the security of
information from the top down.
Further reinforcing the validity of information security governance, (von Solms,
2005) compares two internationally recognized ISG frameworks that can be used by
organizations to govern their information security. These are the COBIT framework for
enterprise IT governance and the ISO/IEC 17799 information security management
standard. Of importance to this research paper is not the results of the comparison, rather
the fact that the concept of ISG is so well established that the need exists to find
frameworks and standards to effectively conduct ISG on a day to day basis. This adds
validity to the thesis question as will be seen later in this paper.
2.2.2

Information Security Management

Looking closer at how information security is managed within an organization
today, the research will now define Information Security Management (ISM) and
communicate its importance and value to enterprises of all types.
Cazemier, Overbeek, and Peters defined ISM as "the process of administering
people, policies, and programs with the objective of assuring continuity of operations
while maintaining strategic alignment with the organizational mission" (as cited in
Choobineh, Dhillon, Grimaila, & Rees, 2007, p. 959). Further, Choobineh et al. (2007)
stated that ISM "activities should be driven by organizational objectives so that no
resources are expended" (p. 959) without understanding how they support the
organizational mission. The authors detail some of the components of ISM by citing
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examples of specific solutions businesses have implemented while performing ISM.
Some of these are vulnerability assessment, developing an intrusion detection capability
for IT systems, and periodically auditing information systems. This demonstrates that
ISM is regarded as a lower level management function within an organization, as
opposed to the high level governance as discussed in the previous section of this paper.
Choobineh et al. (2007) finally argue that a risk management approach to information
security might be a valid approach to ISM, yet there are some issues with properly
understanding the nature of risks involved and the activities undertaken to manage them.
This concept will become important when project security management is discussed later
in this paper.
According to Gupta, Kranz, Ojha, Picot, and Singh (2013) a balanced mix of
technical, procedural and human aspects of information security are necessary to building
an overall ISM system in an organization. Their definition of ISM states that it is a set of
activities involved in configuring resources in order to meet information security needs.
Gupta et al. (2013) explain that ISM requires the active participation of employees across
the hierarchy of an organization in order to be successful. This partly validates the
discussions above regarding ISG and how it ties into ISM. Information security is a
responsibility at all levels within an enterprise and though the executives are primarily
responsible for setting the tone, lower level management is always responsible for
planning, implementing and managing information security at their level.
Gupta et al. (2013) also recognize the importance of the culture in an organization
by stating that an information security culture is about shared values and attitudes of
employees towards the systems and information assets they use daily. The authors also
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make mention of accepted international standards of ISM such as COBIT, GMITS and
GASSP that provide best practice guidelines for managing information security in
organizations. This is more validation that ISM is a well understood concept for
managing information security in modern enterprises.
Some of the literature discusses what not to do within ISM. Von Solms and von
Solms (2004) again discuss with vigor the importance of the corporate level of leadership
that directly affects ISM by listing 10 deadly sins of IS. Not "realizing that information
security is a corporate governance responsibility, not realizing that information security is
a business issue not a technical issue and not realizing the core importance of information
security awareness amongst users" (p. 372) are just three of these points. These points
hammer home the importance of ISM at the mid and lower levels of an organization as
well as the continuous effort required to manage the systems.
2.2.3

Information Security Measures

There are several factors that contribute to the effectiveness of Information
Security Governance (ISG) and Information Security Management (ISM). These are
technology, human factors and what are generally termed policies, practices and
procedures. These three concepts are defined by McCumber (2005) as safeguards or
security controls. The author states that:
Security controls are defined as the management, operational and technical
controls (safeguards or countermeasures) prescribed for an information system
that, taken together, satisfy the specified security requirements and adequately
protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system and its
information. (p. xxiv)
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When information security is mentioned, most people think first of technology
(King, 2000). Technological controls are in part solutions such as Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs), firewalls, anti-virus software, or data encryption algorithms.
Many organizations rely heavily on technology for their IS needs. The Council on
Cyber Security (n.d.) published a list of 20 critical security controls for cyber defense, of
which most are technological solutions, or involve technology in some way. Of course,
many of the controls involve human factors as well as policies, practices and procedures,
however the fact that a large number of the controls involve technology demonstrates the
extensive focus on technological controls organizations rely on to keep information assets
secure. This should make sense given the nature of modern IT use in nearly every
industry around the world.
It is important to remember however that in the past many companies have made
the mistake to rely too heavily on technology, as Choobineh et al. (2007) describe in a
security breach example. In that case, ISM failed because improper policies existed that
oversaw the technical solutions that were implemented. Many authors make the point that
though technological solutions are important, the sole focus should not just be on
technology and that good ISM also involves policies, practices and procedures as well as
a considerations for human factors (Jahner & Krcmar, 2005; King, 2000).
Khansa, Liginlal and Sim (2009) move the ball further in this direction by
focusing on human error as the cause of breaches in IT systems. The authors demonstrate
well how human factors contribute significantly to data breaches occurring and privacy
data being stolen. Khansa et al. (2009) conducted an empirical study gathering
information from 1046 data breaches from January 2005 through June 2008. The results
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demonstrate how human error is a significant determinant of IS. They report that 67% of
all breaches were human error related and 33% were due to malicious acts. The authors
also discuss the difference between slips and mistakes that human being are prone to
make. Slips are defined as the ³incorrect execution of a correct action´, and mistakes as
the ³correct execution of an incorrect action sequence´ (Khansa, Liginlal, & Sim, 2009,
p. 216). Mistakes are in essence planning failures given that the individual executes the
wrong action correctly. They might be trained well on the action to be performed,
however have been instructed to execute something that is incorrect and not fitting the
situation. Slips could be termed execution failures, where the proper action is not
performed correctly. This could be due to the lack of appropriate training of the
individual. The person has been instructed to execute the correct action, but fails to do it
correctly. Slips and mistakes are clearly human factors in information security that must
be addressed by all levels of leadership within an organization.
Other authors have investigated the human factors aspects of IS. Nemati and
Church (2009) have argued for a human centered framework for ISM. They lay out the
case using the healthcare industry, specifically highlighting the effects of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) on hospitals and other healthcare
providers. The authors present a framework for managing the human element of
organizational information security in a way that maximizes data security while also
increasing efficiency (Nemati & Church, 2009). They make the convincing case that a
law like HIPAA is impossible to manage with technological solutions alone. The
exposure this law creates must be met with a broad program of education and effective
management that involves every employee. The authors argue that the key to responding
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effectively to a mandate like HIPAA is to use organizational culture to create an
environment with the security and flexibility to handle various threats to the system.
Nemati and Church (2009) effectively demonstrate how human factors play a key role in
ISM.
Jahner and Krcmar (2005) advocate implementing an IT risk culture in
organizations to assist in ISM. They state that much effort has been put into mitigating IT
risks (in this case security risks) by means of physical, procedural or technological
solutions. However, ³the socio-cultural perspective of managing these risks has largely
been ignored´ (Jahner & Krcmar, 2005, p. 3327). The human factors that affect
information security cannot be ignored and are a large part of ISM at the organizational
level.
As already mentioned, on top of technological solutions and human factors,
appropriate policies, practices and procedures are critical in effective ISM. Jahner and
Krcmar (2005) mention policies and processes as described above. Gupta, Kranz, Ojha,
Picot, and Singh (2013) make extensive references to policies and procedures and their
absolute necessity as part of an effective information security management system.
Policies that cover various issues such as data privacy, electronic media usage, external
devices etc. are some of the policies mentioned in their work. These policies and
procedures are implemented at organizational level covering all or many of the groups
and departments of such firms. They govern and guide the people and the technology that
they use in order to enhance the security posture of an organization and manage risk.
In this section a review of the literature with respect to information security
governance (ISG) was discussed. How high level leadership such as the board of
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directors or the CEO use ISG as a subset of corporate governance to ensure information
security is maintained in their companies was discussed. Also, ISM was outlined in
relevant literature. It was revealed how ISM is used at lower levels of the organization to
manage daily information security issues. The three security controls of technology,
human factors and policies, practices and procedures were discussed in detail by
referencing relevant literature. The next section of this literature review will discuss the
case for PSM by demonstrating how it fits into the overall information security apparatus
described by ISG and ISM.

2.3

A Case for Project Security Management

At this point in the literature review it is clear how organizations manage their
information security (IS). Given the factors discussed above, companies are forced to
manage all aspects of security from top down, involving all levels of leadership all the
way to the lowest level employee. This being the case, it stands to reason that
organizations that execute IT projects for various reasons should consider allowing the
project managers of these endeavors to manage specific security aspects of their projects.
Given that IT projects are unique, temporary and progressively elaborate (Brewer
& Dittman, 2013), the security aspects of these projects are potentially different from the
rest of the company (unique) and can be expected to change as time goes by
(progressively elaborate). The higher level organizational manager of IS cannot keep
track of and stay focused on the daily progression of a multitude of projects being
planned and executed within an organization. Therefore, it would be wise for project
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managers to execute their own information security management plan within their
domains.
Little has been written regarding this specific topic. The standard for project
management today is set by the Project Management Institute (PMI) and its Project
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK). This organization has a myriad of training
courses through which they and their associates produce Project Management
Professionals (PMPs) and other trained professionals in the area of project management.
However, nowhere in the PMBOK document does it reference security management
(Project Management Institute, 2013). Even under the risk management knowledge area
there is no specific mention of managing security risks on projects. This is not to say that
some PMPs do not identify security risks in order to manage them during the project life
cycle. However, there is no framework or standards set within this PMBOK document for
managers of IT projects to manage their security risks, or any internationally accepted
framework for IT project managers to reference. Further, there is no discussion in the
literature reviewed at this point that specifically mentions project managers and their
teams as being part of ISG or ISM.
2.3.1

Critical Security Controls and Risk Management

Pruitt (2013) is one notable reference discussing the topic of managing
information security in IT projects. The author outlines the use of 20 critical security
controls to be used as best practices for IT project managers. These however are the same
controls published by Council on Cyber Security (n.d.). The important distinction
between the two authors is that Pruitt incorporates the 20 security controls in a
framework to be used by project managers to manage their information security during
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project initiation, planning, execution and closing. As an example of how vulnerabilities
are different and more dynamic at the project level vs. the higher organizational level,
Pruitt (2013) suggests:
IT project managers often handle intellectual capital that is the equivalent of the
keys to the kingdom. IT project records are a rich source of valuable documents
and due to the temporary and fast-moving nature of project work, access controls
and records systems may not be maintained after the project closes and the team
moves on. (p. 11)
This is just one of many examples discussed in the paper of how project security
management differs from organizational security management given the various
vulnerabilities and the factors that influence them on projects.
Further, the author references the PMI PMBOK and pulls information security
management into the risk management knowledge area (Pruitt, 2013). This is a critical
idea for the concept of PSM, given that many believe security should be managed as a
risk (Bedi, Gandotra, & Singhal, 2009), and it lends itself to easier execution and
understanding by the project managers since he or she will be managing other risks
within the project life cycle. If information security is managed by project managers
through risk management within the already well established PMBOK framework of the
risk management knowledge area, this will surely lead to a more secure project and a
secure product.
Others have discussed the need for project security management in the past.
Emory (2003) discusses the security of projects during their life cycles making a clear
distinction of securing information of the project, not the security of the product that is
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created. The author states "A project may also have a unique set of security challenges
that an organization may never have encountered or envisaged and that test the bounds of
organizational policy" (p. 1), reinforcing the truth that organizations cannot predict or
effectively manage all aspects of security in every project in their domains. Also Emory
(2003) makes the case that project based organizations may have a hard time to propagate
security policies, practices and procedures through all projects, team members and subcontractors. This is an important point and well worth considering. Leaving some core
security controls up to the project managers to oversee, while supporting him or her in
those efforts, through proper funding and oversight, can potentially yield a better security
environment for the entire organization.
2.3.2

Security Management as a Process

Another viewpoint on PSM and how it can improve information security in
projects and the organizations as well as produce a more secure product is derived from
quality management. Behara, Derrick, and Hu (2006) suggest that if security management
is viewed similar to how quality management is in project management, then perhaps
more secure products will result. The authors discuss some of the history of the quality
revolution which changed industry in the United States in the 1980's. They make the case
that similar methods and a care for managing security during a project's life cycle can
result in better return on investment and a more secure product. Behara et al. (2006) use
Deming's theory of profound knowledge to link quality management to security
management. One element they discuss is regarding variations in systems. The authors tie
common cause variation and assignable cause variation from the quality domain to the
information security domain. Given that quality management of IT projects is a
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universally accepted part of project management, as well as one of the PMBOK's
knowledge areas, it would not be out of line to suggest that managing information
security similar to quality aspects can yield a better product and a more secure project
environment.
2.3.3

Defense in Depth

Finally, a method that reinforces the need for PSM is the defense in depth
concept. Bedi et al. (2009) outline a defense in depth strategy for organizational
information security. They speak of security layers surrounding an asset that needs to be
protected and threats of a certain type and with a certain probability of realization. The
more security layers are implemented the lesser the probability of the asset being
compromised by a threat. When comparing the literature already reviewed and the
concepts discussed therein, it becomes clear that PSM could be viewed as another layer
of a defense in depth strategy. As explained above, an organization deals with
information security at all levels, with each level adding certain specific aspects to the
security posture. A project could be viewed as another level of this form of security
strategy.
Having outlined the overall literature regarding PSM, it is clear that there are few
if any accepted standard for managing information security specifically for projects.
Although there are several papers regarding this topic, none outline a clear framework or
are universally recognized as being a standard to follow. Further, none of the references
specify what effectiveness or costs are associated with managing information security on
projects. Therefore, it is vital to investigate the concept of PSM and if implementing a
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framework to manage security within projects will yield more secure project assets and
products.

2.4

Summary

This chapter has described the review of relevant literature. Starting with
reviewing the concepts of ISG, through ISM to the idea of PSM. The focus was on
explaining how ISG and ISM are used in organization today to provide information
security and how they are structured to provide this security through higher level
management. Also discussed were factors influencing information security such as
technology, human factors and policies, practices and procedures. Finally, the idea of
PSM was discussed and how it can fit into ISG and ISM in order to increase the security
posture of an organization. A clear gap exists in literature in articulating a concept like
project security management and how it might be effective at increasing information
security for organizations by fitting into the well-established management structures that
exist. It is believed by the researcher that a well thought-out framework, used within a
risk management process on IT projects, can result in more secure project assets and
make their resulting products safer.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter will discuss the framework and research methodology used for this
thesis. Researcher bias and data collection methods will also be articulated.

3.1

Framework

The review of relevant literature demonstrated the need for a focused view of
security management at project level within the overall efforts of a larger organization. It
presented a background on the current threats and vulnerabilities organizations are facing,
a clear view of the different facets of information security management, a detailed look at
current information security efforts within organizations, and the present state of thinking
on managing security within projects.
Given the information presented in the literature review, it is clear that managing
information security risk has become of great importance to organizations. Due to the
increase in threats and the persistence of vulnerabilities in virtual and physical systems, it
is necessary to improve the security posture within an organization in order to prevent
loss now and in the future.
Given the complexity of the problem, security measures cannot be a concern for
only one department or group within an organization. All members of an organization
must be involved in managing the risks associated with security issues, including project
managers and anyone engaged in producing new products and services within an
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entity. This is especially true when information technology (IT) projects are being
managed that are considered an important part of a company's portfolio.
Consequently, the question of whether IT project managers should focus more
efforts on security in a comprehensive multi-tiered defense strategy, and would budgeting
for security result in more secure project assets and products, becomes valid. The
previous research question is what this thesis attempts to address. The objective of this
thesis is to take information and recommendations from literature and professionals in the
IT project management and security fields, build a computerized model based on a
security framework design containing a set of vulnerabilities and threats being simulated,
and investigate if project level security risk management yields a stronger security
posture within the IT project, resulting in safer assets and a more secure product. This
thesis will also look at the costs on the budget of projects for the added security posture.

3.2

Researcher Bias

In order to enhance the researcher's credibility, the impact of his bias on this
thesis will be discussed. The motivations of the researcher are important to understand.
First, the researcher is pursuing a master's degree in Computer Information Technology
(CIT). Second, he has focused his curriculum on IT project management and studied risk
management and cyber security issues outside of institutional learning. Lastly, he is a
veteran with a military mindset that puts him in a unique position to look at information
security in a different light than most other civilian professionals would. The history and
experience of the researcher is important to note, given that it influences his belief that
issues like security management are best left to the leaders at the lowest level of an
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organization, or "at the point of friction". Bias will play a role in the way the model will
be developed and how the results will be analyzed. This bias however will benefit the
study because the researchers¶ mindset, interests and experience will help produce valid
and useful conclusions and recommendations.

3.3

Methodology

An analysis of literary sources was conducted to determine which information
security components should be modeled. This included areas in technology, policies,
practices and procedures, and human factors. The researcher relied heavily on other
published works in order to determine which security areas would best reflect a real
world situation where an IT project manager could benefit from managing security risks
within his or her project. The process involved the following steps:
1) Analyze the current state of security risk management, specifically as it
pertains to information security, in order to determine if certain security risks
could be mitigated by project level security management
2) Derive a list of topics in security risk management, specifically in the area of
information security, that would significantly improve security posture at any
level of an organization
3) Determine which components of information security are important for IT
project managers to manage within their project's life cycle and which have
the potential to significantly improve the project's security posture
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a. Note the components of security that are managed primarily or
exclusively at organizational level for use in modeling the
environment a project will be operating in within the model
b. Base the list on a subset of the 20 Critical Security Controls (CSCs)
published by the council on cyber security (Council on Cyber Security,
n.d.)
4) Derive a list threats, based on the chosen CSCs, that organization face for use
in the model
5) Design and build an agent based model within the AnyLogic® system that
simulates a real world environment with threats present, as well as the security
risk management solutions applied by IT project managers (based on the
subset of CSCs)
a. The model reflects specific threats that may attack an organization's
information assets in order to cause damage
b. The model reflects specific management actions taken to improve the
security posture within projects
c. The model collects data on the cost and effectiveness of specific
critical security controls implemented by the organization and the
projects for use in analysis
Figure 3.1 is a high level representation of how the data collected from
literature and professional sources was applied to test the various security
measures managed by IT projects. A threat agent will attack the organization and
the project and have a certain chance to succeed based on the chosen CSCs. The
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researcher assumed, based on literary review, input from professional subjects and
his own experience, that a well-managed project security scheme will increase the
security posture of the project and therefore the organization as a whole.
The model allows for the selection of specific security controls. These
controls can be used at the organizational level as well as the project level,
depending on the scenario the researcher wishes to run. All threats are directly
associated with the selected controls, since the controls are linked to particular
types of attack. Threats are based on the attack types articulated in The Critical
Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense (Council on Cyber Security, n.d.).
For example, CSC #5 Malware Defenses protects against the introduction and
VSUHDGRIPDOZDUHRQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDVVHWVWKHUHIRUHWKHWKUHDWZLOOEH
associated with attempts to introduce malicious software into the organization or
its projects. During the simulation run, the threat continuously attacks the
organization and its projects in order to cause damage. In this research, damage is
not specifically defined and will not be quantified. Each security control
implemented will increase the cost for the project, yet provide a certain level of
enhanced security, thereby reducing the likelihood that an attack is successful,
and reducing the risk level for organizations and projects. After each simulation
run, the effectiveness and cost of the overall security strategy is measured and the
results are used for analysis.
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Figure 3.1 - High Level Agent-Based Model Design
6) Conduct simulation runs in order to produce relevant data to be analyzed.
a. Simulation runs were conducted comparing projects with security risk
management and without, based on a selection of specific security
controls
7) Analyze the data produced by the simulation runs
a. Determine if there is a significant improvement in the security posture
of an IT project in which the manager implements his or her own
security risk management
b. Determine the costs of the added security controls
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8) Conduct research of relevant literature to find information regarding
managing information security in projects
9) Collect information regarding managing information security in projects from
relevant professionals in IT management and security fields
10) Provide recommendations based on the results of the analysis of the
simulation data and any related information from literature or from
professionals
The steps above illustrate the process the researcher followed during this study. It
was assumed that this methodology would create a clear understanding of the
effectiveness of IT project managers actively managing their own security risks within a
larger organizational framework, as well as the costs associated with the added security
controls and their management.
The deliverables of this methodology are information gathered through simulation
runs of the model, literature and professional interviews that was analyzed in order to
determine an answer to the research question. Also, recommendations as to if IT project
managers should or should not engage in active project security management (PSM) are
part of the deliverables. Finally, the model itself delivers a foundation for further
expansion and use by other researchers. Success is measured by the determination,
through data collection from the model, literary and professional sources, if PSM is
effective at increasing the security posture of a project or not, and what costs are
associated with the added security controls.
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3.4

Credibility of the Research

Given the qualitative nature of this study it was necessary that the assertions and
suggestions discussed by the researcher be reviewed in order to increase the validity and
credibility of the research. The suggestions and the findings of this study have been
reviewed by three faculty members with experience in IT project management, cyber
security, homeland security and computerized modeling.
3.4.1

Validity of the AnyLogic® Modeling Tool

Given the use of the AnyLogic® modeling tool for this research, it is important
for establish the validity of the tool.
One way to assist in this task is to highlight other work and research that has been
done with AnyLogic®. The power and flexibility of the tool is demonstrated by one
model in particular. It was developed to analyze the most efficient staffing levels for a
regional hub evacuation center. Dietz, Kirby, and Wojtalewicz (2012) demonstrated that
a well-designed AnyLogic® model can produce valid results that are applicable to real
world situations. The authors modeled a complex environment of thousands of agents, in
this case people and their pets, being moved through a reception center for evacuation.
Each agent had different properties and had to be treated in a unique way within the
system. The large numbers of agents and the many simulation runs that occurred
produced valid, usable data. The authors were able to refine the use of staff at the
reception center within the model and produce results for decision makers to use for
disaster preparation and planning.
Another example of the use of the AnyLogic® tool for agent-based modeling is
demonstrated by Ciarallo, Heath, and Hill (2013). The authors utilize the tool in order to
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implement an agent-base model for improving the costs and operating efficiency of
drivers in warehouses and warehousing strategies. Their model captures, categorizes and
quantifies traffic congestion in the warehouse and the cost due to the congestion
(Ciarallo, Heath, & Hill, 2013). The model presented in the paper is an excellent example
of the power and validity of using AnyLogic® to implement a theoretical model and
produce useful results that gives decision makers critical information.

3.5

Data Collection

The data used to build the computerized model was gathered from literary sources
and interviews of information security and project management professionals.
The information gathered from literary sources includes the 20 CSCs published
by the council on cyber security (Council on Cyber Security, n.d.) that have also been
mentioned by one author and applied to the project management environment (Pruitt,
2013). A subset of these controls was selected by the researcher in order to model a realworld environment. For the sake of scope of the model, the selected controls represent the
IXOOEUHDGWKDQGGHSWKRIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVHFXrity control implementation. The selected
critical security controls include technical, human factor and processes, practices and
procedural controls. These CSCs were selected based on the following criteria:
x

CSC use in industry. Propagation of use and perceived usefulness by security
professionals

x

Data availability for use in model. Does sufficient information exist to
appropriately model the CSC within the AnyLogic® model?

36
x

Appropriate and realistic use of CSC within an organization and a project. The
CSC should have a high likelihood of use within an individual project and not just
at the organizational level

x

The chosen CSCs cover technological, human factor and policy, practices and
procedural security measures

The following six critical security controls are modeled:
x

CSC 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices,
Laptops, Workstations, and Servers

x

CSC 7: Wireless Access Control

x

CSC 15: Controlled Access Based on Need to Know

x

CSC 17: Data Protection

x

CSC 18: Incident Response and Management
Data gathered from professionals consisted of opinions and anecdotes of various

security and management topics related to the research. Also, when possible, specific
data on cost and effectiveness of various security controls was gathered. A total of six
professionals were questioned via email, starting with specific questions and often
leading to follow on conversations. All conversations occurred between early November
2014 and mid-March 2015. The information provided by these professionals will be used
throughout this paper to reach conclusions and in order to assist in the analysis of the
model output data. Every email sent and received by the researcher is listed in Appendix
A.
The following individuals were consulted for the research:
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x

Subject A: Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) for a large public
university; Organizational Structure: Functional; Relevant certifications: CISSP,
CRISC

x

Subject B: Project Manager, responsible for Security & Policy for a large public
university. Organizational Structure: Functional; Relevant certifications: PMP

x

Subject C: Project Manager and Technical Lead for a commercial software
company that developed cloud-based communications services for active content
websites. Organizational Structure: Functional, project-based for current
department/project;

x

Subject D: Program Manager for a commercial software company that develops
software for government agencies. Organizational Structure: Projectized;
Relevant certifications: PMP, CSM

x

Subject E: Project Manager, for a government agency. Organizational Structure:
Functional; Relevant certifications: PMP, CSM, CISSP, CISM

x

Subject F: Information Systems Security Manager for a commercial software
company that develops software for government agencies. Organizational
Structure: Projectized; Relevant certifications: CSM, CISSP, ITIL, ICP
At first, the subjects were asked a particular set of questions relating to the topic

of information security and managing security risk on projects. This lead to more follow
up questions to either clarify points or to gain more detailed answers. The questions
asked initially of all subject are listed as follows:
x

Do you think project managers who manage security, including information
security, for their project above and beyond what the organization mandates
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(assuming vulnerabilities have been considered and a threat assessment made) add
to the security posture of the organization? Do you have any examples from past
or current projects where you or others have done this, or similar management?
x

Would you consider information security management a part of risk management?

x

Do you think that project security management, in particular looking at
information security, could lead to more secure project assets and products?

x

How does your organization handle information security, in particular for
projects? How are you organized, who is responsible for what tasks? In general,
what technology do you use (does not have to be specific), how do you deal with
human factors (ex. training) and what policies and practices are there in your
organization regarding information security?

x

Do you have any hard numbers of budget expenditures for information security
and its effectiveness (ROI perhaps)? Any percentage numbers of information
security expenditures per budget for projects would help. (If you do and it is
propriety/secret information you don't have to divulge it of course - this is
understandably the most difficult information to obtain)
All email correspondence with each subject is listed in Appendix A for reference.
Also, critical thinking and input from the researcher's committee members has

been used in the design of the model in order to appropriately leverage the various data
collected from literature and professionals. Researcher bias, as discussed previously had
the largest impact during the design of the model and its implementation. The design
reflects a system that is based on the researcher's listed biases.
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The computerized model and the data obtained from it through a series of
simulation runs was a vital part to obtain the data required to answer the thesis question.
Also, information gathered from literary sources and professionals was used to highlight
and provide context for the data from the model, as well as support the overall
conclusions and recommendations. The data gathered from each simulation run included
the number of attacks perpetrated by a threat, how many attacks were defeated and by
which level (organization or project). Also, the cost, as a percentage of total IT security
budget, of implementing each security control and its relative effectiveness was part of
the output. The data from all simulation runs was compared and analyzed and
conclusions drawn from it. All of the data produced and outputted by the model runs is
included in its entirety in Appendix B.

3.6

Model Design

Several important pieces are part of the model design. The core of the model
centers on the CSCs that are intended to model the real-world implementation of security
controls. As discussed above, several of these were selected from the total list of 20. They
were selected to provide coverage for technical, human factor and policies, practices and
procedural security measures. Each CSC has one or more attack types associated with it,
as listed by the council on cyber security (Council on Cyber Security, n.d.). Also, each
CSC has a cost and a risk mitigation or defensive effectiveness rating associate with it.
The cost values for each CSC represents the percentage cost added to an IT security
budget. The effectiveness value of each CSC is the relative effectiveness that it provides
against a single attack by a threat. So, the effectiveness value represents the percentage
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chance the CSC has to defend against an attack. By designing the model to include these
CSCs it allows for a more robust analysis of the effectiveness of the various security
layers in an organization, including the project level security.
Given that the model is agent-based, numerous agents are modeled that interact
with each other during a simulation run. The first agent is the Organization Agent (OA).
This agent is designed to have all CSCs available and active at all times, and is intended
to model the organizational level security structure. These CSCs provide one layer of
security from threats at a certain cost.
Another agent is the Project Agent (PA) that represents a project within an
organization with its own CSCs based on the uniqueness of the project and its
environment. These CSCs provide the lowest layer of security within an organization and
are the most important part of the research. These CSCs and their modeling are important
to answering the research question of this study.
The last agent is the Threat Agent (TA). This agent models an attacker who seeks
to exploit a vulnerability that a CSC is associated with. The TA attacks the organizational
and project levels in order to exploit this vulnerability. One TA is modeled within the
simulation and represents the totality of threats in a real world environment.
The model design is intended to produce a simple way to measure the
effectiveness of project level security management. It is not intended to create a fullfeatured model that takes into account every aspect of a real-world scenario. It is based
on accepted security principles that are being used in many organizations today.
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3.7

Summary

Determining the validity of security management at the project level and its cost
and effectiveness is the primary purpose of this study. The means to determining the
answer to the research question is through analysis of literature, input and opinions of
professionals in the project management and security fields, and the analysis of data
generated by a computerized model. The analysis should shed light on the validity and
effectiveness of the concept of project security management and its associated costs. The
researcher hopes that project management and security professionals can use the findings
and recommendations presented in this paper to the benefit of their organizations.
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CHAPTER 4. MODEL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

4.1

Introduction

In WRGD\¶V highly connected and data-driven world where information is a key
asset to organizations, the threats to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of such
information is enormous. Recent, highly visible attacks on various businesses and
government agencies have highlighted to more than security experts the threats that
organizations face in protecting information (Krebs, 2014a; Krebs, 2014d; Mandiant,
2013). Information security issues, and the results of attacks and breaches, are
increasingly being published in main-stream media outlets, for better or for worse
(Collins, 2015; Dawson, 2015). Certainly, these publications are resulting in an increased
awareness of the effects of poor information security to the general population,
contributing to more pressure on organizations to improve and optimize their overall
security posture and manage the risks associated with information security more
effectively. It is no longer just financial or trade secrets that organizations lose from
security incidents and breaches. Prestige, customer trust and the very jobs of senior
leaders are at stake.
Looking at the current state of information security, Symantec (2014) reports that
total breaches were up in 2013 by 63% from 2012, a trend which is likely to continue.
Cybercrime cost to the global economy ranged from $375 to $575 billion dollars
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annually, with an average estimated loss of $2.7 million per cybercrime incident (PwC,
2014). Further the same author reports that larger organizations incur higher costs from
security incidents. Threats from cyber espionage by government entities, terror groups,
businesses, criminal gangs and other sources will continue to increase in frequency
(McAfee, 2015). In this environment, organizations of all types and sizes need to plan for
and implement new forms of protections and risk management practices in order to keep
their valuable data as secure as possible, and deal with negative events and their impacts.
One way to assist in the planning, and to make the implementation of security controls
more efficient and effective, is the use of computerized modeling. Using computerized
models, based on real-world environments, leaders and decision-makers can more
accurately predict the effectiveness of various security controls and their costs. If the
model incorporates technological, human factor, and policies, practices and procedural
controls in its design, the result would be of value to an organization. The data gathered
from the simulation runs can be used to predict current and future effectiveness of the
security controls and their costs. These methods will aid organizations in their
information security related risk management endeavors.
This paper will use a unique model in order to demonstrate the usefulness and
validity of this approach. Agent-based modeling (ABM) will be used in order to
implement a simple design based on a defense in depth strategy using a sub-section of the
20 critical security controls (CSCs) published by the Council on Cyber Security (Council
on Cyber Security, n.d.). The data resulting from simulation runs will demonstrate the
relative effectiveness of various CSC implementation strategies and their budgetary costs.
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4.2

Agent-Based Modeling

According to Gilbert (2008)³Formally, agent-based modeling is a computational
method that enables a researcher to create, analyze, and experiment with models
composed of agents that interact within an environment.´ S 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) was chosen for the design and implementation of
the model based on the properties of the organization, its embedded projects and the
threats which will interact with both. As the name suggest, this method of modeling
makes use of autonomous agents where each has a set of attributes and behaviors that
define how the agent will behave in response to changes in its environment (Palgrave
Connect (Online service) & Taylor, 2014). In agent-based modeling, the relationships and
connections between agents are also of importance as well as the environment in which
the agents operate in (Palgrave Connect (Online service) & Taylor, 2014). Therefore, the
system in an agent-based model consists of the agents, their relationships and the
environment where they exist in.
One can see now that in order to achieve valid and useful results for the
information security issues spoken about above, using the agent-based model
methodology is a wise choice. Having multiple agents autonomously interacting with
each other is arguably the most effective way to simulate real-world environments and
behavior in the context of information security. It also allows for greater flexibility in
choosing different courses of action for various simulation runs, as the reader will see
below.
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4.3

Model Design

This section will discuss the model design in detail. The approach taken in the
design was based on a course-of-action (COA) decision making process. That means the
results of the model runs are intended for managers and leaders to make important
decisions regarding security control effectiveness and costs. These individuals are able to
select certain COAs in order to determine which of these was most effective and at what
cost. This methodology is very much grounded in the effective military approach to
planning and decision making in a unit¶V staff planning. The staff will create three
specific COAs for the commander to choose from and let him or her decide on the best
one for the execution of an operation. The Department of the Army (2012) lays out the
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) in its doctrinal publication ADP 5-0 The
Operations Process (p.8). It explains the process taken by military leaders and their staffs
to determine the best COA for any one particular operation. This falls in line with the
decisions an organization needs to make regarding information security. Certain actions
must be taken to defend the organizational assets in the future and any tools and methods
that can help in this planning are valuable. Hence, the reason for looking at the design of
this model in these terms. Allowing certain COAs to be chosen by the user and then run
within the simulation in order to determine the most effective security controls to
implement in an organization and its projects.
4.3.1

The Critical Security Controls

At the core of the design are the 20 Critical Security Controls (CSCs), published
by the Council on Cyber Security (Council on Cyber Security, n.d.). These form the basis
of effectiveness and cost values used to determine the validity of the COA chosen for a
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simulation run. A user may select a certain number of these to explore a specific security
strategy, run the simulation and observe the overall effectiveness of the strategy chosen,
and its relative cost. In order to properly scope the project, only six out of the 20 CSCs
were selected in the design. It was also determined by the researcher that it would not be
unnecessary at to include all 20 CSCs at this point, given that the ones chosen properly
represent the whole. All choices were based on the following criteria:
x

CSC use in industry. Propagation of use and perceived usefulness by security
professionals

x

Data availability for use in model. Does sufficient information exist to
appropriately model the CSC within the AnyLogic® model?

x

Appropriate and realistic use of CSC within an organization and a project. The
CSC should have a high likelihood of use within an individual project and not just
at the organizational level

x

The chosen CSCs cover technological, human factor and policy, practices and
procedural security measures
All 20 security controls were evaluated and studied in detail using the critical

security controls for effective cyber defense (version 5.0) (Council on Cyber Security,
n.d.). Also, Security best practices for IT project managers (Pruitt, 2013) was consulted
in order to tie in relevancy of the CSCs for projects and their managers. A summary
document of the evaluation process the author used to choose the six CSCs for the model
can be found in Appendix C. It contains relevant details on each CSC gathered from the
documents mentioned above and assisted in focusing the UHVHDUFKHU¶V thoughts in regards
to the CSCs.
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The following six critical security controls, taken from the council on cyber security
(Council on Cyber Security, n.d.), were selected and are modeled (p. 19 ± 95):
x

CSC 3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices,
Laptops, Workstations, and Servers

x

CSC 7: Wireless Access Control

x

CSC 9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps

x

CSC 15: Controlled Access Based on Need to Know

x

CSC 17: Data Protection

x

CSC 18: Incident Response and Management
Now that the topic of the CSCs has been conveyed, the author will discuss the

high level conceptual model before explaining the COA decision and comparison
process.
4.3.2

Describing the High-Level Conceptual Model

Before delving into the details of the COA decision making process inherent in
the model, or the details of its design, it is worthwhile to discuss the high level conceptual
model upon which all of it is based. The figure below gives a quick glimpse of the
concept on which the model is built. At its center is the idea that a project (or a team of
some size) is the lowest level of leadership or management in the organization that can
affect the security posture of the organization as a whole, and of course its own internal
security posture. This idea can be broadly defined as Project Security Management
(PSM). Therefore its leaders must take security related risk into account, and in the case
of this research, information security in particular. This conceptual model is built
primarily on the simple defense in depth concept, viewed in the context of a management
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and leadership hierarchy. As an example of defense in depth applied to information
security, (Bedi, Gandotra, & Singhal, 2009) outline a defense in depth strategy for
organizational information security. They speak of security layers surrounding an asset
that needs to be protected and threats of a certain type and with a certain probability of
realization. The more security layers are implemented the lesser the probability of the
asset being compromised by a threat. This concept is also well understood by military
professionals and examples of such practice are many throughout human history. The
figure below demonstrates the use of agent-based modeling inherent in the design and
implementation of the model, and describes at a high level the defense in depth method.

Figure 4.1 ± High Level Model Design
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The basic idea is that projects with various levels of CSC implementation are part
of an organization with its own CSC protections. The threat agents, representing realworld threats, continuously attack the organization and its projects, seeking to exploit
vulnerabilities. Given the use of the defense in depth strategy (or put in other terms, a
multi-tiered defensive strategy, each tier being a management level), threats must first
penetrate the defenses provided by the organization before being able to attack project
assets directly. As discussed above, the Critical Security Controls are a vital part of the
equation. They provide not only the defense against threats, but also point us to the type
of asset and the method of attack the threats might use. A CSC is built to defend specific
assets against one or more types of attacks. Effectiveness of defense and costs are also
directly tied to each CSC, data which we will see is most critical.
4.3.3

COA Decision Making Process

In this section, the course of action (COA) decision making process will be
discussed. As mentioned above, the model implementation is built around it and the
process is meant to feed the model with decisions from the user. For obvious reasons, it is
a shortened and more simplified decision making process than what is outlined in ADP 50 The Operations Process (Department of the Army, 2012). The following figure
demonstrates the process taken in order to determine an appropriate COA.

50

Figure 4.2 ± Model COA Decision Making Process
For the scenario setup the user performs a threat assessment and determines the
risk appetite of the organization overall, and the project specifically. This is similar to
evaluating capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy forces before battle. Next,
the user will set up a scenario using the available information. This includes what threats
exist to the organization and its projects and what critical security controls (CSCs) are
needed in defense. The effectiveness and cost values are directly associated with the
chosen CSCs and can be configured easily in the model, as we will see later in the
implementation section of this paper. For example, if there is a threat from bad actors
using wireless access points, CSC #7: Wireless Access Control can be implemented and
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the effectiveness and cost values of this control will be considered in the scenario. Other
inputs include the scenario runtime which represents one budget cycle. The cost of each
control is measured in percentage of project budget for the budget cycle, be it a year or
the length of the project. Also, multiple runs with the same data can be selected in order
to later extract and analyze mean effectiveness values for the overall COA selected.
During the simulation run, data is collected and written to a spreadsheet. The specific
data collected from the model during runtime is the following:
x

Total Number of Attacks

x

Number of Attacks on the Organization

x

Number of Successful Attacks on the Organization

x

Number of Successful Defenses on the Organization

x

Number of Attacks on the Project

x

Number of Successful Attacks on the Project

x

Number of Successful Defenses on the Project

x

Total Cost to Project
After the completion of each scenario, the data that was written to the file can be

analyzed in the COA comparison process. If, for example, one scenario has three of the
six CSCs implemented vs. another scenario that had all six in use, a comparison of the
number of successful attacks and defenses can be made. This process is denoted in the
grey box in Figure 4.2.
4.3.4

User Input and Scenario Run Design

Next this paper will discuss the process the user follows in order to input the
above discussed information and how to set up a scenario. Figure 4.3 below displays the
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process of selecting the various inputs for a scenario run.

Figure 4.3 ± Scenario Setup Process
The user is presented with a startup screen where all information is entered. He or
she may select which CSCs are needed at the project for the scenario and adjusts the
specific cost and effectiveness values. As mentioned above, the cost numbers entered
represent percentage cost of each CSC of total security budget expenditure. The
effectiveness numbers are the percentage chance each CSC has to successfully defend
against a single attack. These values and how they are used in the system will be
discussed in the model implementation section. After these selections have been made,
the user can then determine the length of each scenario run and how many times the
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scenario shall run in one session. As already stated, the length of each run represents one
project budget cycle and is not designed to be a certain real-world time. After the
information is entered, the simulation is run. Figure 4.4 demonstrates the process the
model executes during a run.

Figure 4.4 ± Model Runtime Diagram
When the simulation starts, the threat agent immediately starts to attack the
organizational CSCs and whichever project CSCs were implemented. First, the threat will
determine which vulnerability to exploit. Once this has been determined, the organization
will be attacked and the probability of a successful attack or a successful defense will be
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determined. If the model calculates that a successful defense occurred, the logic will then
test if the run is complete or not, and if the scenario needs to continue, the process will
repeat and the threat will once again attack the organization. If a successful attack occurs
on the organizational level, the threat will then attack the project level security control.
Once again, a process will be executed to determine a successful attack or defense and
the logic will proceed further to check if the run is complete or not. While all of this
processing is occurring, the data on attacks and defenses is being collected. As mentioned
in section 4.3.3, several metrics are gathered for later analysis and written to a
spreadsheet.
Now that the design of the model and what concepts it is based on are explained,
the detailed implementation will be discussed.

4.4

Model Implementation

The creation of the model was accomplished within the AnyLogic® Multimethod
Simulation Software. The two main parts of the implementation were the user interface
(UI), and the underlying logic using an agent-based finite state machine (FSM). Using the
FSM was the best method to model the interactions of agents and their various states.
Also, a state machine implementation lends itself for possible model expansion in the
future, which is a large part of the motivations behind developing this base model. This
particular topic will be discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter.
The overall goal of the implementation was of course to achieve the desired
design as described in the previous section in regards to the course of action selection,
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and to provide the data in order to come to conclusions as to which COA is the most
effective.
4.4.1

The User Interface

The user interface was the first piece to be developed and was created to allow the
user to enter the information needed for a simulation run. Figure 4.5 below is the final
implementation of the interface called the PSM Simulation Configuration Screen.

Figure 4.5 ± PSM Simulation Configuration Screen
As one can see, the interface provides all the necessary input mechanism in order
WRIXOILOOWKHGHVLJQ¶VLQWHQW2QWKHOHIWKDQGVLGHRIWKHVFUHHQWKHXVHUPD\VHOHFW
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through a series of check boxes, which critical security controls shall be used in the
project during one simulation run. The details of each CSC, what they are and what
protections they should provide to an organization or its projects are outlined in
Appendix C. Note that a total of six CSCs are implemented. On the right hand side of the
screen is where the user may enter the cost and effectiveness values for each specific
CSC.
Note that CSC 18: Incident Response and Management is unique in that it affects
WKHRWKHUILYH¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVYDOues during the simulation run. If this CSC is used in a
run, it will enhance the effectiveness of the other controls by the percentage value
selected, after a threat successfully breaches the project defenses. This implementation is
based on the principle that if security incidents are properly responded to and managed,
the organization and project members will learn from it and their overall security posture
will improve. Although the primary focus of the incident response and management
control is to mitigate the impact of a security incident (Ahmad, Hadgkiss, & Ruighaver,
2012), one could make the argument that going through the process improves the security
posture, given the knowledge gained by the team regarding the attack. Ahmad et al.
(2012) also state WKDW³organizational learning is paramount, enabling organizations to
OHDUQHIIHFWLYHO\IURPWKHSDVWDQGQRWVXIIHUUHSHDWLQFLGHQWVRUPLVWDNHV´ (p. 651). The
improvement modeled is directly related to the type of attack, which is related to the
specific CSC that is implemented to provide protections from that attack type.
Finally, the user can adjust the runtime and the number of runs to conduct. The
runtime reflects one project budget cycle. The number of runs determines how many runs
to conduct with the same inputs and at the selected runtime. This allows for multiple runs
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to be averaged, later in analysis. When all information is entered, the user can proceed
with the scenario execution by clicking the run button.
Figure 4.6 below shows the execution view of the simulation.

Figure 4.6 ± Simulation Execution View
As the simulation runs, the bar chart continuously updates. The legend displayed
all relevant information on the left of the chart. As with all other AnyLogic® models,
execution time can be controlled with the run controls on the top. This particular screen is
QRWLQWHQGHGWREHPRUHWKDQDTXLFNYLVXDOGLVSOD\RIZKDWLVRFFXUULQJ³XQGHUWKH
KRRG´7RREWDLQRXWSXWGDWDTXLFNO\WKHXVHUFDQ fast-forward the simulation and the
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system will write all of it to the database, in this case a spreadsheet. Depending on how
long the runs are and how many are executed, the file will contain a certain number of
records that can be analyzed.
Now that the user interface has been presented, the important underlying
functionality will be explained.
4.4.2

The State Machine Logic

As already mentioned, the core of the system is based on state machine within the
threat agent. Since the determination was made by the researcher that critical security
controls protect certain assets, and these CSCs are associated with particular types of
attacks, it made perfect sense to have the threat agent contain the bulk of the functionality
and logic. In its current version, the model is focused on what actions the threats take
during the simulation, and not what counter-actions the organizations or projects take.
The actions of the latter are perfectly well simulated by the selection of the CSCs by the
user. That is, if a user select a specific critical security control, this means the threat agent
now has it as a choice to attack during the run and the CSC has a certain chance to defend
against the attack, simulating the actions of an organization or a project team defending
against the attack. In the future, more extensive and granular modeling can be
accomplished by giving organizational agents and project agents their own state
machines. These expansions of the model will be discussed later. For now, this concise
implementation suffices for what needs be accomplished in a simulation run. The
following diagram, figure 4.7 presents the threat agent state machine, which is the core of
the model.
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Figure 4.7 ± Threat Agent State Machine
This figure is a screen capture from the AnyLogic® development environment.
The many states the threat can take are represented and each relevant transition is labeled.
The initial state the threat enters is the pause state. This state was created to solve a
technical implementation issue and is not of significance to the logic.
The first relevant state the threat takes is the AssessOrg state. As the name
suggests, the threat will assess the organization and its vulnerabilities. It is intended to
combine reconnaissance and target selection. Currently, the model does not detail real
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world threat behavior since it is out of the scope of this paper, therefore the
implementation is basic in nature. In the AssessOrg state, the threat will randomly select
a target in the organization to attack, which is one of the five CSCs implemented in the
model. Note again that CSC 18: Incident Response and Management is not a control that
should be selected for attack given its special purpose, which is to positively affect the
other controls after a breach occurs.
After a target has been selected, the threat enters the AttackOrg state where the
threat agent will attempt to exploit a vulnerability. The CSC is the focal point, since it has
cost and effectiveness information associated with it. In this state, the attackTarget
function is called and a determination is made if the attack was successful or not, and the
organization is breached or not. The core of the implementation is the randomTrue
method provided in the AnyLogic® library. This function is passed a probability value p
from 0.00 ± 1.00 and generates a true response with the given probability. It generates a
false response with 1 - p probability. The purpose of this state is to simulate the
effectiveness of a certain CSC. Each control has a chance to defend against its associated
attacks. After the determination is made if the attack was successful or not, the state will
change back to the AssessOrg state if unsuccessful, or to AssessProj if the attack resulted
in a breach. Before doing so, the threat will enter either the OrgDefended or OrgBreached
states, depending on which holds true. These states are primarily for data collection and
to provide a means to include the incident response and management control.
When the threat state enters the AssessProj state, the same process that occurred
in AssessOrg is launched. However, the threat will now assess the CSCs implemented in
the project (selected by user in the configuration screen). As with the organization, a
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control is randomly selected. The determination was made by the researcher that a breach
relating to any organizational CSC opens the door for any other vulnerability to be
exploited in a project. For example, if wireless access control fails at the organizational
level, it does not mean that the project is only vulnerable to wireless access control
related threats. This property of the model is easily modifiable if it does not accurately
UHIOHFWDQ\RQHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VUHDOLWLHV
Now, the AttackProj state is entered and again the attackTarget method is called.
The exact same calculations occur as did on the organizational agent, yet now they are
related to the probability of a successful attack occurring to the project agent. If an attack
fails or succeeds, the threat will revert back to the AssessOrg state. Before this state
however, it will enter either the ProjDefended or ProjBreached states. Both states are
currently used for data collection and in the case of ProjBreached to run routines which
are related to the incident response and management control. As described above, this
control is intended to simulate the improvements in defenses that are typically achieved
with good incident management. It is important to note that in any future version of the
model, these states will be included in the project agent or in the case of the organization,
in its agent. For this version of the model these states were included in the threat agent for
simplicity sake.
Next sample data from a simulation run will be discussed.
4.4.3

Sample Run

When a simulation is run, the data is pushed to a spreadsheet for analysis. The
following section includes output from two separate runs with different configurations in
order to demonstrate how the model can be used to set up and choosHYDULRXV&2$¶V
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First, a discussion on the basis of the selected cost and effectiveness values needs
to occur. The author found enough relevant data to be able to estimate the cost of IT
security measures and can deduce percentage budget cost per critical security control
implemented. The choice of cost as a percentage of budget was made, given the wide
monetary figures reported by various organizations. It was necessary to normalize the
data and the best approach was using percentage figured related to IT security budgets as
opposed to any range of monetary values. Everett (2010) reports that IT security spending
is around 10-15% of IT budgets. This out of a total IT budget ranging from 1.0% to 8.1%,
depending on industry (Gartner, 2013). Further, IT budgets will grant an estimated 11%
to security projects (Brocklehurst, 2014). These figures give a good reference to how
much a single CSC should cost as percentage of budget for any scenario run. A choice of
2 ± 2.5% would suffice to be valid for the six security controls implemented in the model.
Obtaining accurate effectiveness values was however not possible given the
apparent confidentiality of this information to organizations. No specific data was found
in literature or by interviewing professionals that was usable for this particular model.
General figures to help assess relative effectiveness were discovered, such as 71% of
system compromises not being immediately detected (Trustwave, 2014). Further,
according to the same author, 31% of compromises were related to weak passwords.
Given these statistics, it is not clear however that we can make an absolute determination
of the effectiveness of any one CSC related to these numbers, in particular given the
variability of organizations and their unique structures and CSC implementation. Finding
specific probability-based numbers for the 20 Critical Security Controls was difficult, so
certain judgment-based decisions had to be made.
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In the end, the researcher believes that although it would be positive to have exact
figures, it is not necessary to demonstrate the value of the model and its potential, nor to
come to a conclusion based on the inputs. This is because one can run numerous
configurations with different cost and effectiveness values based on whatever specific
metrics that were gathered, be they confidential or not. An organization can utilize their
own data to feed the model. Further, one can optimize them to determine important facts
about the relationship between costs and related effectiveness. What is important is the
concept the model implements. Being a defense in depth based model allowing an
individual to create multiple defensive strategies and determine which one is best suited
for the situation.
With this in mind, the following two courses of action will be presented in order
to demoQVWUDWHWKHYDOXHRIWKHPRGHO7KHWZR&2$¶VZHUHVHWXSZLWKWKHIROORZLQJ
inputs:
x

Cost for each implemented CSC is 2% of project budget

x

Effectiveness for each CSC is 95, meaning a 95% chance of defending
against any one attack

x

Model run time: 1000 simulation seconds

x

Number of Runs: 10

x

Run #1: Implement five CSCs

x

Run #2: Implement two CSCs
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Run #1 Output:

Figure 4.8 ± Run #1 Output Example
Run #2 Output:

Figure 4.9 ± Run #2 Output Example
)RUERWK&2$¶VHDFKUXQZDVFRQGXFWHGWHQWLPHVDQGWKHRXWSXWIURPHDFK
individual run was averaged. The model allows for the running of as many simulation
runs as the user deems necessary to achieve desired results.
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As one can see, the first COA implements all five CSCs and shows a reduced
amount of successful project attacks (two attacks) vs. the second COA which only used
two separate CSCs for defense, resulting in 29 successful attacks on the project. The cost
for the first COA is measured at 10% of the project budget, vs. only four percent for the
second COA.
Depending on the specific data available to the researcher using the model, the
cost and effectiveness values that feed the model will be more detailed and reflect the
specific case that he or she is looking into. This will provide a more robust and valid
result upon which leaders can make certain decisions about CSC implementation.
4.4.4

Future Model Expansion

Although this base model and its implementation in AnyLogic® can serve a
useful purpose, it is the hope of the author that the model be expanded to fit the needs of
different organizations. Some of the suggestions are presented now.
4.4.4.1 Threat Behavior
Some organizations might have a need to model the behavior of threats in more
detail. The current model provides the baseline of an agent-based approach to modeling
these threats. Expansion in the threat state machine would allow for more realistic and
granular implementation of the various threat behaviors. The model implementation
could expand to include numerous types of threats that get data input from the user
interface or a database to allow threats to exhibit different actions during the simulation
runs in order to better serve the needs of specific organizations in their threat related
research.
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4.4.4.2 Adding Multiple Project Agents and Adding Program Agents
The model can also be expanded to include multiple project agents. Also, the
program management level in an organization can be added to more realistically model
certain organizational structures. Of course, any agent can be included in the
implementation in order to model whatever structure is needed to give a more accurate
representation of reality. The basic hooks have been placed into the model in order to
allow a simpler transition to this kind of expansion.
4.4.4.3 Detailed State Machine for Project Agents
In line with the expansion of the model for multiple project agents, these agents
can be modeled with their own separate state machine and functionality to accurately
reflect actions taken by project management and staff to ward of whatever attacks are
committed against the project assets (detailed project security management modeling).
Also, state machines can be included for any other agents deemed necessary, such as
Program agents. The expansion of these agents will allow a more seamless tie-in with the
following point regarding Asset agents.
4.4.4.4 Integrate Asset Agents
In order to come closer and closer to a real-world system and its encompassing
environment within the model, it is suggested that an Asset agent be created. This agent
will represent any asset that an organization or its projects own. Examples include
routers, laptops, desktops, mobile devices or wireless access points. The reasoning behind
including this type of agent is to allow for finer granularity in the modeling of how assets
are attacked and defended, as well as how attacks can propagate through IT networks. If a
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project owns an asset and implements a critical security control meant to protect it, this
would more accurately represent the true nature of the system. When the asset is attacked
by a threat, the interactions between the project agents with its implemented CSCs, the
asset agent and the threat will produce a more accurate modeling. The value in this to an
organization will be a much increased confidence in the validity of the output data.
4.4.4.5 Use of Real Time
,QRUGHUWRWLHWKHFRVWDQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVRXWSXWVWRDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VUHDO-world
operations, real time must be used in the model. In the future, it will not suffice to
represent a budget cycle with relative time. Managers and decision makers will want to
know what the costs and effectiveness of controls are for a real budget cycle or project
life cycle. Also, implementing real time will allow for more realistic modeling of threats.
The model will be able to simulate threat attacks over time by using data on how many
attacks of which type occur in a real time period.
4.4.4.6 Detailed Critical Security Control Implementation
There is a lot more to the CSCs than the current model implements. It is
recommended that the details of each control be represented in the model. This will have
to tie into the improved threat behavior and the Asset agent in future versions. Of course,
if this expansion becomes a reality it will provide a more accurate representation of the
effectiveness and costs of each CSC, leading to better decisions by the users of the model
output.
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4.4.4.7 Full Critical Security Control Use
The last recommended expansion is the full inclusion of all 20 Critical Security
Controls. This will enable organizations that have not yet implemented certain controls to
estimate the cost and effectiveness of these controls before effort is spent on them in a
real environment.

4.5

Summary

This chapter presented a unique modeling approach for choosing certain courses
of action relating to critical security controls. The model, implemented using AnyLogic®
Multimethod Simulation Software, provides the means to estimate the effectiveness and
costs of certain CSC implementation strategies. It allows for the user to build these
defensive strategies and utilize the resulting data from numerous simulation runs. It is
possible to expand the model beyond the current baseline to be more granular and valid
for the needs of specific organizations. The output from this model was used, in part, to
deduce the following conclusions and recommendations.
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CHAPTER 5. PRESENTATION OF DATA, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1

Introduction

,QWRGD\¶VKLJKO\Fonnected and data-driven world where information is a key
asset to organizations, the threats to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of such
information is enormous. Recent, highly visible attacks on various businesses and
government agencies have highlighted to more than just security experts the threats that
organizations face in protecting information (Krebs, 2014a; Krebs, 2014d; Mandiant,
2013). Information security issues, and the results of attacks and breaches, are
increasingly being published in main-stream media outlets, for better or for worse
(Collins, 2015; Dawson, 2015). Certainly, these publications are resulting in an increased
awareness of the effects of poor information security to the general population,
contributing to more pressure on organizations to improve and optimize their overall
security posture and manage the risks associated with information security more
effectively. On top of monetary, trade secret and intellectual property loss, organizations
are subject to loss of customer trust and prestige. Further, the positions and livelihoods of
senior executives are increasingly at stake.
Looking at the current state of information security, Symantec (2014) reports that
total breaches were up in 2013 by 63% from 2012, a trend which is likely to continue.
Cybercrime cost to the global economy ranged from $375 to $575 billion dollars
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annually, with an average estimated loss of $2.7 million per cybercrime incident (PwC,
2014). Further the same author reports that larger organizations incur higher costs from
security incidents. Threats from cyber espionage by government entities, terror groups,
businesses, criminal gangs and other sources will continue to increase in frequency
(McAfee, 2015). In this environment, organizations of all types and sizes need to plan for
and implement new forms of protections and risk management practices in order to keep
their valuable data as secure as possible.
This chapter will present means to improve security risk management for an
organization by focusing on the projects within them. Specifically, on the project
managers and their efforts to provide better security of their assets during the project life
cycle and therefore improve the safety of the product.
The idea that all levels of management in an organization are responsible for
information security is not new or novel. However, the author has not found many
concrete sources in literature that specifically define or articulate this idea. Certainly,
there are organizations that permeate a strong security culture throughout all levels of the
enterprise, though as we will see below, it is often through an informal process based
chiefly on the expertise and knowledge of current leadership within the organizational
structure. Also, given the auWKRU¶VELDVDQGH[SHULHQFHLQPLOLWDU\PDWWHUVKHVWURQJO\
believes in the concept of mission tactics where the lowest level subordinate is allowed
freedom of command in order to accomplish a mission. The higher levels of leadership
will support in the endeavor, yet not dictate the exact means of achieving mission
success. This equates in better results given the fact that the lowest level of leadership
knows its environment and needs best, and can act on them more effectively and
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efficiently. This also breeds a sense of trust and loyalty within these junior leaders, which
is an important component in any successful organization.
This chapter is divided into three major components. One, the literary sources
supporting the idea of formal project security management. Secondly, interviews of
several professionals in the information security and project managements fields. Lastly,
results from the running of the agent-based model discussed in the previous chapter
demonstrating the effects of a defense in depth strategy involving organizational level
and project level security management.
After the presentation of all data sources, conclusions and recommendations will
be made. Analysis of the data provided will be made where needed within each separate
section.

5.2

Presentation of Data

This section will present the information gathered from the three sources, which
are literary, subject interviews and computerized model. The structure is intended to build
an understanding in the reader of the overall concept this thesis paper presents, and what
sources were consulted before any conclusions or recommendations are made. Given the
qualitative nature of this research, the method of triangulation was used in order to
deduce conclusions and recommendations. The intent behind the literary research in this
chapter was to create a foundation in the understanding of the concept proposed in this
paper and to present valid sources. The reasoning behind the subject interviews was to
confirm or deny the sources in literature and build on them if similarities can be found.
Finally, the intent behind building a foundational model was one, to back up the two
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other sources for the establishment of conclusions and recommendations, and two, to
create a model that can be built upon and used by organizations in the future to assist in
determining cost and effectiveness of various security strategies involving project
security management. Once this section is presented and an understanding is created in
WKHUHDGHU¶VPLQG, the author will present his conclusions and recommendations on the
topic discussed.
5.2.1

Literary Sources

5.2.1.1 Mission Tactics
In order to successfully move forward, the author must explain his reasoning for
approaching the problem faced by organizations regarding information security in a
particular way. Having a military background, the author has a certain bias towards how
successful organizations operate. His experience has taught him that placing trust and
responsibility in subordinates, while properly supervising them, is an approach that will
most often lead to successful outcomes. This approach in the realm of war is not unique
to one present military force, though it is well defined by one service, the United States
Marine Corps, as mission tactics. It is central to putting their doctrine of maneuver
warfare into practice (Department of the Navy, 1997). 7KHDXWKRUVWDWHVWKDW³Mission
WDFWLFVLV«WKHWDFWLFVRIDVVLJQLQJDVXERUGLQDWHPLVVLRQZLWKRXWVSHFLI\LQJKRZWKH
PLVVLRQPXVWEHDFFRPSOLVKHG´(Department of the Navy, 1997, p. 87), DQGDOVRWKDW³We
leave the manner of accomplishing the mission to the subordinate, thereby allowing the
freedom - and establishing the duty - for the subordinate to take whatever steps deemed
necessary based on the situation.´ S  This form of practicing war on the tactical and
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operational levels has been proven successful over many decades and continues to yield
positive results for the service in accomplishing missions assigned.
From this perspective, the author approaches the problems faceGLQWRGD\¶V
interconnected world with all of the threats to information technology (IT) systems and
the information contained and used within them. Looking at the various management
levels within organizations of all types and sizes, and seeing a need to think differently
about the issue, the author took steps to research literature that would illuminate his
suggestions and experiences. To be certain, there is and never will be a one to one
mapping of a military organization with a civilian one. However, the researcher believes
that there are enough similarities, and that in most cases at least some of the ideas can
transfer. This is mainly because, both war and information security are and will remain
innately human affairs no matter how advanced technology becomes. The reason war
exists is because of human nature, and the reason we build IT products and services is
because of human need. Human factors like skill, morale and leadership must be taken
into consideration in both arenas and not just the technology associated with both.
5.2.1.2 Managing Security Risk on Projects
For project managers, assessing and then managing risks to projects is an
important task that runs throughout its life cycle. Managing risks to budget, logistics,
personnel and other areas of the project are critical to success. Within the overall
structure of risk management are also security related risks to consider. These might be
physical in nature, such as the risk of theft of documents, or relating to information stored
and transferred digitally. Unfortunately, the formal management of security risks during
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the project life cycle does not appear well established or much acknowledged in literature
or common knowledge. For example, the 5th edition of the project management
LQVWLWXWH¶V30%2. 3roject Management Institute, 2013), does not mention security in
relation to managing risks in projects. Although it does speak of security of
communications, which is a risk to consider, this is not involved enough to satisfy.
Further, few documents exist that speak of managing security risks during the project life
cycle, and in particular relating to information security. One can make the safe
assessment that many project managers do manage security risks, and in particular those
effecting information, though there does not appear to be a common understanding of the
importance or benefits of it. This chapter will look at some of the literature researched
that starts to set the path towards thinking about managing information security risks on
projects.
Pruitt (2013) articulates the concept of managing project risks related to
information security within the context of implementing the 20 critical security controls
published by the council on cyber security (Council on Cyber Security, n.d.). The author
suggests ways for project managers to properly manage information security risks using
the controls presented, by integrating security into the project management methodology
(Pruitt, 2013). Instead of making security an afterthought on a project, which
unfortunately occurs all too often, properly integrating security considerations early on
will avoid cost, scope and time issues on projects. Also, building in security checkpoints
(or milestones) ³during several key processes will ensure progress toward desired
security´ (Pruitt, 2013, p. 4). The author clearly puts the focus and the responsibility on
the project managers to provide better security during the project life cycle and upon
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product delivery. It is interesting to note that the author also addresses the differences
between larger and smaller organizations. Pruitt (2013) determines that larger
organizations might already have certain security stage gates that are required to pass on
to the next phase in projects, but that smaller ones might have to assign a reviewer to
affect the same. This is an important point for the overall thoughts of this research. The
question of the lowest level manager taking responsibility for managing risks is given
worth by acknowledging the needs smaller organizations have in this regard. If project
managers increase their efforts to manage information security risks, using the 20
security controls or any other framework, the need for higher level support by the
organization decreases. This will lower the burden on the upper leadership and
information security management professionals in an organization, allowing them to
focus on more pressing matters. It will also contribute to the overall security posture of
the organization by hardening the project and its resulting product against risks relating to
information security.
Another point made by Pruitt (2013) is a relationship drawn between security and
the cost of quality on a project. The cost of quality being appraisal costs and the failure
costs, both internal and external. In terms of security, appraisal costs might include
preventative measures such as implementing the critical security controls during the
project life cycle. For failure costs Pruitt (2013) correctly states:
The costs of failure include the costs to recover from a cyber-security incident
like a data loss or theft. Those recovery costs would include external failure costs
like loss of goodwill, lost sales, fines, liability costs, investigation of incidents and
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remediation as well as internal failure costs like wasted work, rework, and failed
handoff to operations. (p. 6)
,WZRXOGEHVDIHWRVD\WKDWVLQFHWKHTXDOLW\UHYROXWLRQLQWKH¶VDQGLWV
application to software development and the IT industry, managing quality within
projects is well established. Quality management methodologies like CMMI and Six
Sigma are known to be effective at improving the quality of delivered products. The
D[LRP³4XDOLW\LV)UHH´FRLQHGE\3KLOLS&URVE\LVZHOOXQGHUVWRRGDQGFODLPHGWUXHE\
many. It is also understood that project managers have a direct and important role in
managing the quality of the products their projects produce. So the question remains, why
not the same formal processes and methodologies as well as general acceptance of the
concept for managing security, specifically information security? Could the term
³6HFXULW\LV)UHH´EHYDOLGQRZRULQWKHIXWXUH"Perhaps it is the difficulty of quantifying
information security, whereas better and more quantitative metrics exists for measuring
the quality of a product and process.
Progress however has been made in establishing security related metrics. For
example, the Center for Internet Security (2010) has produced a set of metrics specific to
security. These metrics are defined in several categories such as management, operational
DQGWHFKQLFDOPHWULFV0HWULFVOLNH³0HDQ&RVWRI,QFLGHQWV´RU³3HUFHQWDJHRI
&RQILJXUDWLRQ&RPSOLDQFH´DUHYDOXDEOHIRUWKHPDQDJHPHQWZKLOH³1XPEHURI
,QFLGHQWV´DQG³1XPEHURI$SSOLFDWLRQV´DUHPRUHRIDWHFKQLFDOQDWXUHAlso, the critical
security controls mentioned above are heavy on validating implementation. Metrics that
can be used to measure successful information security management. The point to make
is that general accepted metrics exist that can be collected in order to measure the
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effectiveness of managing information security within organizations and their
subordinate projects. Similar to measuring quality metrics within a project, the project
manager can apply these or metrics to measuring the effects of his or her project security
management. Of course, the project is not an island and as with many other things within
an organization, the backing of corporate leadership is critical. Given the increase of
threats and attacks worldwide and the resulting breaches mentioned above, it would be in
the best interest of the highest level of leadership to engage in these security related
efforts just like their predecessors did during the quality revolution and beyond.
Security management cuts across all process groups within a project. It is
important during initiation, planning, execution, closing and of course controlling
(Emory, 2003). This author talks about a Security Management Plan (SMP). If security
risks are not considered on projects the results can effect scope, time, cost and quality.
This plan can be viewed as falling under the overall risk management plan and brings
together all security related aspects relevant to the project, including any organizational
security requirements. Given the amount of information a project might produce,
depending on type and size, it stands to reason that the location where this information is
created is the first and best line of defense. If a project manager and his or her team
conducts a robust security risk assessment and has put the proper controls into place,
while managing them throughout the project life cycle, the assets of the project and its
resulting product must be more secure than without these efforts.
Another point to be made for the adoption of more robust information security
management on projects is the variability and uniqueness inherent in organizations.
&KRRELQHKHWDO  VWDWHWKDW³RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHDVXQLTXHDVKXPDQEHLQJVDUH´DQG
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WKDW³RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHRUJDQLFG\QDPLFHQWLWLHVWKDWFKDQJHRYHUWLPH´ (p. 963). These
are most true statements DQGLW¶VZRUWKFRQVLGHULQJWKHLPSDFWWKHVHIDFWVKDYHRQ
information security for an organization. Information security management (ISM) is
harder to properly conduct within an organization when the security professionals are
separated from the business-related segments. Inevitably, the chief information security
officer (CISO) and his or her subordinates must find ways to effect the overall security
posture of the organization while keeping in mind not to restrict the business itself.
Security professionals must be enablers to the business, not disablers for the sake of
security. This is where the management of security risks by project managers can assist in
dealing with the dynamism inherent in any organization while assisting the CISO with
increasing the security posture. Project managers and their teams create innovation, and
are at the cutting edge for most companies, driving them forward to success. When the
project managers conduct the management of their own information security risks, within
the overall organizational framework, all of the information and innovation produced by
the projects is secured at inception. Further, Choobineh et al. (2007) correctly state that
³the best policies, procedures, and practices will have little or no value if they are not
followed´ (p. 963). Security professionals often have a difficult time ensuring that
everyone in the organization follows established policies and practices. Even some
security minded individuals are often lax with certain practices. Khansa et al. (2009)
make the case that human errors in the form of slips and mistakes are a significant part of
security breaches. Slips, EHLQJGHILQHGDW³H[HFXWLRQIDLOXUHV´UHODWHbest to the above
mentioned failure to follow proper policies, practices and procedures. A way to increase
the chance that employees perform these guidelines appropriately is through proper
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supervision or management. This can be accomplished best through the lowest level of
leadership, namely through project managers. If project managers consider the security
risks in human factors and plan towards them while managing them during the project
life cycle, they are able to better effect the security posture of their project, product and
the organization as a whole. A well-managed project information security plan will
contribute to the organizational security posture managed by the CISO and his or her
staff. In an organization that is smaller and that does not have the resources for an
information security management staff, this concept becomes even more critical. With
these smaller organizations, the need to manage security risks by the project managers
becomes even higher since they will not have the benefit of the expertise of the security
professionals. A formal process to manage these risks must be utilized in order to
properly assess and manage the risks.
In order to summarize these thoughts, the author would like to point out another
valuable statement by Pruitt (2013):
PMs are not expected to be security experts, but by including security
considerations in every phase and process of a project, especially in initiating and
planning, communications and deliverables, PMs have the opportunity to deliver
more secure systems in a more secure manner. (p. 18)
The above summarizes the potential benefits and organization will reap through
emphasizing the management of information security risk in projects. Ultimately, the
purpose of conducting projects is to produce something of value to the organization.
Having this done in a secure manner will only benefit the organization by yielding a more
secure product while keeping information secure during the project life cycle.
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One aspect not mentioned in this section are the costs associated to the project
with increased emphasis on security management. This item will be discussed in more
detail in the following sections. It will become clear to the reader that costs will increase
and project budgets might swell, though the benefits will outweigh the added costs.
5.2.2

Subject Interviews

The researcher conducted interviews via email correspondence with several
professionals in the project management and security fields. Every individuals
interviewed is employed in information technology (IT), serving organizations that
develop and manage state-of-the-art IT solutions. The purpose of these interviews was to
discover parallels to the literary sources and to either confirm or deny the validity of
managing information security risks at the project level. Also, the intent was to provide
input on the costs and effectiveness of having project managers involved in information
security management within their projects.
All subject information and the questions asked of them are listen in chapter three
above.
5.2.2.1 Security Management is Risk Management
One of the first questions asked of the subjects is if they considered information
security management on projects as risk management. The author wanted to establish a
clear baseline in thought for this paper in order to move forward in exploring the topic
deeper. The answers given were unanimous. Every respondent considered information
security risks as falling under risk management. When security issues are properly
managed, the overall risk level for a project decreases. Subject D stated: ³,I,FDQPLWLJDWH
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the information security risk, then my overall risk profile decreases´DVLPSOHDQGGLUHFW
way of stating a widely accepted belief in regards to security risk management. Clearly,
in any framework that manages information security at any level of management within
an organization, it should be considered as risk management and fall under the risk
management plan.
5.2.2.2 Security Management and Quality Management
One of the most important facets of the concept of actively managing security on
projects is its potential parallels with quality management. As mentioned above in
literature, there are advocates of this idea. It is not hard to see the similarities of quality
management on projects, in order to produce a better product and reduce time and costs,
with the management of information security. Many advocates of quality management in
the past and present have made VWDWHPHQWVLQGLFDWLQJWKDWTXDOLW\LVHYHU\RQH¶V
responsibility. It is not just left up to executive leadership to advocate quality processes
and project managers to follow them. Each employee within the organization and in
particular on projects that create innovation have a role to play in ensuring the quality
process produces a quality product. The same can be said in regards to security. As
6XEMHFW$VWDWHV³(YHU\RQHLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUVHFXULW\´
The parallels with the early quality movement in IT are also evident in the
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DQVZHUV,QWKHSDVWPDQ\GHYHORSHUVDQGWKHLUPDQDJHUVRQSURMHFWV
rejected any quality procHVVHVDV³UHGWDSH´RUH[WUDZRUNZLWKQREHQHILWWRWKHHPSOR\HH
or product. These thoughts have been disproved over time and most professionals
understand the value that a well planned and executed quality management plan brings to
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the project team and the resulting product. In regards to security management, there
seems to be similar concerns at this point in time with the understanding of how
information security management can help a project. Subject B claims that security
mandates can be viewed by the project managers, and his or her staff, as red tape and that
the importance of information security varies with project managers. The participant also
suggests that collecting metrics that demonstrate the cost of loss of work or intellectual
property due to security incidents will assist in convincing project managers and
employees of the value of proper security management. As one can see, the similarities
ZLWKWKHHDUO\TXDOLW\PRYHPHQWDUHFOHDU7RGD\¶Vquality metrics are extensive and
demonstrate clearly the advantage of managing quality throughout the project life cycle.
Subject B also points out that a bottom-up approach in regards to introducing information
security management on projects would be a wise direction to take. Again, as was with
quality movement, simple directives by senior executives will not suffice. Buy-in by all
members of the organization must occur. Subject D states that if developers were looking
at their code with a mindset focused on current security vulnerabilities, their code would
EHVDIHU$OVRWKDWPRVWGHYHORSHUVUHO\WRRPXFKRQWKH³RXWHUFDVWlH´DQGUHO\WRR
heavily on someone else to keep their work secure. This is a clear parallel in mindset to
what project members, including managers, had before proper and effective quality
processes were introduced. They relied too heavily on acceptance testing or other
methods of testing after code was produced, instead of thinking quality while developing.
So, if these developers can think quality during the development process, then they can
think security also. It is up to the manager of the project to introduce effective security
management processes during development to ensure the team can execute them
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effectively. This might include certain tools and technology that automate periodic
testing, as subject D also states. This is however not an absolute solution and at the very
least will increase the instances of failed security testing, forcing developers to redo
work, and at the very worst letting critical vulnerabilities slip though the tests which lead
to security breaches once the product is delivered. A more effective way is to introduce
information security management at the project level in order to increase the security
posture of the organization and enhance the security of the final product, just like quality
management and quality processes have contributed to better quality products over time.
5.2.2.3 Project Managers Improve the Security Posture of Organizations
One of the core elements of support for the question of project managers
practicing information security risk management is if by doing so, do they and their
teams increase the overall security posture of the organization. The security posture of an
organization can be measured by the collective implementation of technology, human
factors and policies, practices and procedures in regards to security. Technology such as
anti-malware certainly increases this posture and so does a policy that directs
administrators to update the virus definitions regularly. Human factors such as security
awareness can be improved by training and experience. All of these contribute to the
organization by raising the overall security level. Most of these efforts today are focused
on the organization as a whole, usually managed by the CISO or another security-related
professional. Projects and their managers are of course part of the organization and one
would presume that they would benefit from the organizational level initiatives. The
question before us is, would a project manager with increased focus on security as
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described above add more value towards the security of the organization as a whole? This
is an important question, in particular to executives seeking to maximize their
expenditures towards information security measures.
According to the results of the questions, all subjects agree that project managers
add to the security posture of the organization. Several subjects of course mention the
balance between cost and security, which will be discussed in more detail below. The
important part to note is that all subjects seem to understand the importance project
managers play in any organization. Subject F states ³I see Project Managers as the face of
the Project´FRUUHFWO\VWDWLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKLVLQGLYLGXDOWRWKHSURMHFWSHUFHSWion
and outcome. So it is valid to think of the project manager as the lynchpin of the project.
They must consider many things during the life cycle such as risk, quality and
communications management, therefore he or she would be the best person to consider
managing the information security aspect of a project. Another person interviewed
commented in regards to certain units within an organization that ³a robust cybersecurity
program with highly engineered systems will likely have a reduced active threat count «
FRPSDUHGWRDOHVVDGYDQFHGHQJLQHHUHGSURJUDP´. If one considers a project a unit of
sorts, then this statement hold true. Far from red tape, implementing and managing a
robust security risk management plan would result in an increased security posture for the
entire organization, and ensure the safety of project assets while producing a safer
product.
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5.2.2.4 Costs of Security and Return on Investment
In this last section on information gathered by relevant subjects, the author will
discuss the comments made in regards to costs of implementing any security measure or
security risk management framework.
Nothing is free and certainly security comes at a cost. Security risk management,
as with any risk management, can only be justified if it returns something of value to the
organization or its expenditure is balanced with the risk appetite of the organization. The
problem has always been measuring the return on investment (ROI). As Subject E points
out, some investments in security, and its management, is due to government mandates
and considered a cost in that context. There is no direct return on investment as with
other expenditures. However, some commercial companies protecting trade secrets or
intellectual property could consider ROI, though this is still very difficult to measure. As
mentioned above, the cost of security is no longer simply monetary or loss of trade
secrets or intellectual property. Prestige, customer loyalty and reputation is also
increasingly at stake for organizations. These intangibles are of course not easy to
measure, however it is clear that they are important to some organizations. One subject
mentioned that piece of mind is important in regards to knowing that organizational
assets are protected, which is certainly a unique form of ROI.
Currently, very little tracking of direct expenditures on security is conducted in
DQ\RIWKHVXEMHFWV¶RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶,WZRXOGEHKDUGWRGHWHUPLQHDGLUHFWGROODUDPRXQW
Subject E stated that a previous employer spent 35-45% of their budget on security,
though this was heavily dependent on the type of organization and the information to be
protected. Just as with measuring certain security related metrics, expenditures that relate
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directly to security activity must be taken if leaders want to gain insight into the cost of
these actions. There are some expenditures which are easy to measure. Subject C notes
that they contract outside security experts for regular audits on their developed software
in order to detect vulnerabilities. This is an approach many organizations take and as far
as projects, something that might fit well into a security management plan to reduce the
likelihood and impact of security incidents. Though the author found a figure in literature
regarding security expenditure of total IT budgets, which was 10-15% (Everett, 2010),
this specific number was not conveyed by the subjects. This is due to the above
mentioned issues with keeping track of security expenditures, and the variable types of
the organizations the subjects are employed by. Given the knowledge gained from the
subjects, it is therefore hard to accept numbers such as 10-15% referenced through
literature. If organizations want to estimate the costs of project security management in
more detail, better metrics must be gathered in order to do so.
5.2.3

Model Data

This section will present the model data and its effect on the following
conclusions and recommendations. The detailed output of all model runs can be found in
Appendix B.
5.2.3.1 Model Output
A total of seven runs with differeQW&2$¶VZDVFRQGXFWHGThe cost for each
control was set at 2 percent of project budget and the effectiveness at 95 percent. These
values are simply an estimate of cost and effectiveness and not related to any specific
data gathered in research. They are figures produced by the researchers through general
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analysis and thought process, and represent enough accuracy to be valid for the purpose
of this chapter. Each run was set at 1000 seconds simulation time with a total of 10 runs
per input data. All runs for each data set were averaged to produce results. Again, all of
the simulation input data is selectable by the user to more accurately reflect the specific
situation. The following summary output was produced:

Figure 5.1 ± Summary Model Output
As the reader can see, the data presents the total number of attacks by a threat
agent within the runtime period, the total organizational and project attacks as well as
how many were successful or not. This data is meant to demonstrate the defense in depth
concept and how and increased emphasis on security by project managers can result in
fewer breaches at a particular cost. As the number of CSC uses by the project staff
increase, fewer attacks against the project are successful. This is demonstrated by the
Successful Project Attacks column. The last row is a special case with the use of CSC 18:
Incident Response and Management. The model simulates the improvement of security
measures if a breach occurs, given that proper management of an incident results in
learning that increases overall effectiveness of security staff.
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Though this model is basic in its design and implementation it is valid in
providing insight into how managing information security in projects can result in fewer
security incidents. This is done via a simple defense in depth strategy. Of course, in a real
environment there are many more variables to consider. This model has the potential to
be expanded in many different and interesting ways to provide a more granular
representation of the real world, as discussed in chapter four. This AnyLogic® model
serves its purpose in the context of this research, though it is the hope of the author that
the model will be expanded in meaningful way to assist organizations in their security
risk management planning.

5.3

Conclusions

Given the information presented above, conclusions can be made regarding the
validity of the concept of information security management on projects, as well as its
potential effectiveness and cost.
The data presented from three sources point towards certain conclusions in favor
of the proposed method, however there are still unknowns that need to be considered. To
a degree, analysis of the information has occurred within the above sections, though a
more detailed look at the data and the resulting conclusions will be made currently.
The doctrine of mission tactics and its application in war lends itself to the overall
concept of pushing responsibility of leadership to the lowest possible level. Within the
context of project managers and information security management this is no different.
The reason for allowing such freedom of decision-making for junior leaders in war is not
just communications problems on the battlefield. It is also the fact that these leaders
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know the environment they operate in best, and when individuals are given responsibility
and trust they tend to excel. When project managers are given the freedom to adopt
information security management strategies of their own, tailored to their environment,
better solutions to these problems result. Advantages of this kind of freedom in decision
making leads to increased innovation in civilian enterprises, just as it results in unique
solutions to problems in war.
Knowing the environment the project operates in is not the only advantage of
pushing responsibility of leadership to the lowest level. Human factors are a critical part
of information security organization-wide, and some argue the most vital factor. Most
experienced project managers will attest that people are the most important asset to a
project. Through them it either succeeds or fails. Empowering the project managers to
create his or her own information security management strategy will leverage the
knowledge gained by this individual of the project staff. Organizational security staff
cannot know the expertise, talents and temperaments of each member on a project.
Project managers should be knowledgeable in this area for many different reasons. The
understanding he or she has of the project staff will allow for a better information
security plan, adding to or surpassing any organizational level plan. Analyzing the
responses from subjects the author believes that the majority of professionals agree with
the belief that more involvement of project managers in security management is a net
positive for the security posture of the organization and the project. Also that, in most
cases, they will better be able to manage specific security strategies than the overall
organization. The fact that project managers are not security experts is understood,
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though they can contribute to this area just as they contribute to other knowledge areas of
the project.
The similarities between project quality management and security management
are undeniable and the data presented above make this clear. Information security
management appears to be in a stage of development that quality management was in
years ago. Professionals understand the worth of managing security organization-wide
though there is resistance to its formal or detailed management in every segment of the
entity. This resistance is slowly fading with every breach reported in the media and
suffered in silence by many organizations. Just as project managers slowly adapted
quality management processes, it is evident that they are increasingly adapting various
forms of security management for their project. As literature and subject interviews
pointed out, many project managers agree that more emphasis on information security on
projects will add to the security posture of an organization, keep assets more secure and
produce a safer product. If this was conducted in a defense-in-depth strategy it can yield
positive results, as the computerized model suggests.
Although the effectiveness and potential benefits of information security
management on projects has been well articulated, a critical piece in these conclusions to
consider are the costs. As described above it was extremely difficult for the author to find
exact, or even general costs of any implementation. The variables are far too numerous
and a detailed analysis is out of the scope of this paper. However, if a particular
organization were to explore the concept presented here with propriety budget
information, accurate information could be gathered. To accomplish this, the
environment needs to be analyzed, metrics need to be gathered and other factors such as
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organizational risk appetite need to be considered. Once these tasks are complete, more
accurate costs of project security management can be found and conclusions made on
them specific to the organization.
The author can conclude that project managers should implement a formal
information security management plan within the overall risk management plan. The
benefits of such actions are more secure project assets and a more secure product.
Recommendations on ways to implement such a plan are discussed in the next section.

5.4

Recommendations

The intent of this research was to determine if more attention should be paid by
project managers in managing their information security risks on projects, and if these
efforts might lead to more secure project assets and resulting products. Based on the
sources of data and its analysis the author believes there is ample evidence that such
methods should be pursued, and that project managers should be more involved in project
security management.
It is recommended that project managers consider their information security risks
in a formal process aided by the organizational assets. This might include security
experts, other more experiences project managers, or members of the project team. They
would be well served to manage these special risks with similar processes as quality
controls, gathering metrics and making decision based upon the data. Project managers
should interface with whatever organizational resources available and consider the
security risk management framework the organization is using. If no set processes or
frameworks are in use organization wide, and no support given, the author recommends
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project managers familiarize themselves with information security control standards.
Publications such as ISO/IEC 27002, NIST SP800-53, or the 20 critical security controls
can give keen insight into what the project might require. These controls of course are
subject to a risk assessment and analysis, and when used form part of the overall
information security management plan. As mentioned above, the exact costs of such a
plan is hard to determine and very dependent on the size, type and structure of the
organization. Project managers must be cautious to balance the costs with the benefit of
added security. In order to do this, proper metrics must be gathered and it will take
certain time to accomplish this. It is recommended that the most critical controls be
implemented first on the project and metrics tracked, including any added cost of
managing them.

5.5

Future Research

This section will discuss possible future research that can be conducted on the
topic of information security management on projects.
5.5.1 Quantitative Research
As discussed above, if proper security metrics were gathered, certain hypothesis
regarding project security management could be tested. The research in this paper can be
the qualitative foundation for such future endeavors. The author hopes that a future
researcher will have the ability to gather such quantitative data and produce results that
either support or deny the results from this particular research paper. Looking back at
how quality management evolved can give us answers as to how to properly commit to
this course of action. Once enough specific data existed, gathered from quality metrics, it

93
was shown that actively managing quality on a project was of value to an organization.
The author believes, based on the information provided in this paper, that this will also
hold true for security management.
5.5.2

Security Management Plan Framework

Future research should be conducted which suggests a project specific
information security management plan. The author has not found any definite methods or
useable frameworks that accomplish this. Of course, there are many organizations that
have created ways in-house to deal with these and similar security issues, however a
broader and more comprehensive framework that can withstand the scrutiny of
professionals and academics would further this topic. Developing a practical framework
for project managers to use in order to secure their projects would be of value, by
suggesting ways to properly manage information security risks. This plan can include
many different topics such as what security controls to use, or what processes are going
to be in place to assist in security related management.
5.5.3

Security Process Improvement

There is a possibility to conduct research into security processes for projects,
similar to quality management processes and process improvement. Future researchers
can look into the viability of developing these processes and systems and how they might
benefit the security posture of a project and the organization. If these security
management process improvement methodologies are seen to be of benefit, similar to
how quality processes have proven valuable, then researchers could suggest how to
implement the security processes.
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5.5.4

Computerized Modeling

One path to take for future research would be the expansion of the base model
presented in this paper. The potential to create a proper tool that is able to accurately
estimate the effectiveness and costs of an information security strategy implemented on a
project is immense. If thiVPRGHOZHUHH[SDQGHGWRUHIOHFWDQRUJDQL]DWLRQV¶WUXHVL]H
structure and type it would be a valuable asset in predicting future security strategies.
Project managers could use this tool during initiation and planning phases to help in
determining what the information security management plan consists of. They can predict
which controls are the most effective for their specific environment and what their
implementation would cost in time and budget. This lets them adapt their security
strategy to the risk appetite of the organization with more accuracy. An accurate and
detailed tool like this will support decision making in regards to security on projects and
perhaps organization-wide.
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Appendix A

Data Collection Emails

Robert,
See response below. Also, I have added <REDACTED> to this thread. I have provided
her with some background so please feel free to reach out to her when you are ready.
-<REDACTED>
From: Robert [mailto:rbott@purdue.edu]
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2014 1:30 PM
To: <REDACTED>
Cc: <REDACTED>
Subject: RE: Project Security Management Thesis
<REDACTED>,
I have replied to your answers below.
Robert
From: <REDACTED>
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 4:25 PM
To: 'Robert'
Cc: <REDACTED>
Subject: RE: Project Security Management Thesis
Robert,
6HHP\UHVSRQVHLQOLQHEHORZ«
<REDACTED>, CISSP, CRISC
CISO, Interim
<REDACTED>
Office <REDACTED>
From: Robert [mailto:rbott@purdue.edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2014 12:05 PM
To: <REDACTED>
Cc: <REDACTED>
Subject: Project Security Management Thesis
Sir,
I want to thank you again for your time this morning. The information you shared will
help me with my thesis work. As discussed, below are some of the questions I had
regarding security management. I understand that some of the information I am asking
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about is confidential, so it is not a problem if you cannot give me specifics. If you could
still enlighten me in general it can still help greatly. I am also looking forward to talking
to <REDACTED> regarding project management and security.
Questions follow:
1. What level of funding and how much effort by employees is spent on security
specifically, in particular management functions (percentage of funding for
operations and on projects)? The answer to this depends on the scope of your
question. From an IT organization perspective, we just started tracking effort
spent on security tasks. However, out of the total IT budget on all campuses, my
group has approximately 4% of that budget. With that said, the old saying goes
³HYHU\RQHLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUVHFXULW\´VRIRUH[DPSOHVHUYHUDGPLQVZRXOGEH
responsible for patching. 7KHUHLVVSHQGWKHUHEXW,KRQHVWO\GRQ¶WNQRZZKDW
that is.
- To narrow the question, this scenario will work. If you consider patching as part of your
technological security solution (even if it is also to improve performance, add new
features etc.), then one could say the server admins are spending time on security
management, correct? Yes. Adding all the time they spend on performing security
patching and other security related tasks, what percentage of their total work week does
this add up to? This is a very rough guess, but I would suggest they spend about 2% of
their time on average per week if you consider tracking the patches, implementing, etc. If
you apply this to a project and let's say the PM identified a particular security risk coming
from the specific servers they use, then the patching they do would be a part of project
security management (in a minor way at least). I know it is difficult to come up with a
solid number for cost, and measuring the effectiveness of risk management is always
tricky, but anything close to reality would be helpful at this point. I hope I have explained
it a little better. Perhaps when PM's perform project security management in the future
they can account for costs by putting tasks related to security management on the WBS
and then on the Gantt chart etc. giving a full account of effort spent on it. 6RPH30¶V
actually do this as part of their projects, but <REDACTED> can give you more specifics.
2. How effective are your information and physical security management efforts and
how do you measure them? My scope is related to information technology
security. We have just started to track some metrics (operationally), but the
security management program is based upon risk measurements. We have done
qualitative risk assessments in the past (just for the WL campus) to help build our
URDGPDSVRXWEXWLW¶VQRWDVHIIHFWLYHDV,¶GOLNH We will soon be looking at an
overall risk management program to help better measure security risk. I would
DOVRDGGWKDW$XGLWDVVLVWVZLWKWKLVDVZHOO«WKH\DXGLWDJDLQVWZKDWLVLQSODFHWR
help us measure effective controls. )URPDSK\VLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH,FDQ¶WUHDOO\
answer because that is not necessarily within scope oIZKDW,¶YHEHHQWDVNHGWR
do. In reality, we have a card office (not part of my organization) that deals with
physical access controls, safety and security that deals with cameras, etc. but no
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RQH WKDW,NQRZRI LVUHDOO\FKDUJHGZLWK³SK\VLFDOVHFXULW\´ We have looked at
processes related to data center access, however.
- So I guess the question is do you and your group feel like the security risk management
program is effective, if viewed through your professional lens? I would say that based
upon what we know and the constraints that we have it is effective. If I compare where
we were 10 years ago to today, we have made great strides, but there is always more to
do. With both questions one and two I am trying to relate a number of monetary and/or
time expenditure with another that demonstrates the level of effectiveness. If your
networks were constantly being breached and information lost, you might say "x%
dollars spent on security is not effective", or if you rarely have security issues you could
say "x% dollars spent is good enough for our risk appetite". Anything helps, I can always
put on my qualitative and biased researcher glasses for my thesis and explain what I did
to the model in the paper. I also have literary sources that can yield some helpful insights.
I hope I am making sense. 6RIRUSK\VLFDO,FDQ¶WUHDOO\DQVZHUWKDW From an IT
perspective, our risk appetite changes depending on leadership. ,¶PQRWDVULVNDGYHUVHDV
some other are in the security field. Ultimately we are trying to protect data while
balancing the business needs. We do have some data controls/policies in place, but the
verification of the controls is where we stumble. I would say that for now (until we have
a well-developed risk process in place) our spend is good enough for our risk appetite.
3. Do you and your security staff focus consciously on technological security
solutions, human factors and processes, procedures and practices when creating
security plans and/or managing security? Yes, we typically look at technology,
process, and people from a risk perspective.
You briefly discussed how you involve project managers in security this morning. If you
had the time to elaborate on this process and perhaps how things might be done more
effectively by involving project managers it would help. Assuming I made my case well
enough regarding security management at the project level, how do you see this concept
working for you and your organization, if at all? This is a very interesting topic. When I
think of project managers and what they are tasked to do, one of the components is risk
identification. +RZHYHU,GRQ¶WWKLQNZHGRDVHFXULW\ULVNLGHQWLILFDWLRQDVVHVVPHQW
with the project managers we have in our organization. I think, from a risk perspective,
they focus on lack of resources, funding, etc. ,WKLQN\RX¶OOJDLQPRUHLQVLJKWZLWKWKLV
one when I connect you with <REDACTED>.
- I am looking forward to talking to her regarding project management and security.
<REDACTED> seems to be just the right person to talk to. Thank you again for taking
the time to answer my questions.

Again, I understand the sensitive nature of these questions so I will not be upset if you
cannot answer them fully or at all. I am hoping I can get some general pieces of
information on top of the literature I found that will help me build a more complete valid
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FKDOOHQJHZHIDFHLVQRWWKDW30VGRQ¶WZDQWWRSURYLGHDGHTXDWHSODQQLQJWRZDUGV
security, but rather those are unknown / unknowns risks. If a project team has no
LQYROYHPHQWIURPDVHFXULW\PLQGHGSHUVRQWKHQWKHUH¶VQRZD\WKH\NQRZWKDW
protecting themselves is a key element.
- Could you see a scenario where the organization is security conscious and has
set policies, practices and procedures that ensure PM's take care of unknown/unknowns
by mandating involvement of security personnel? A mandate stating "you will spend X
hours doing security related planning" for example. Either these security experts are part
of the team, or you involve them through the communications plan in order to get their
expertise as it relates to the specifics of the project. I would classify this is project
security management (PSM), which would most likely fall under risk management. You
identify security risks using the security SME and then apply your mitigation strategies.
This should yield a far higher security posture at the project level and therefore make the
organization stronger. At the very least it has the potential to produce team members that
are more security conscience. As a professional PM, what do you think about this?
While I think the mandating of proper involvement comes with the best of intentions, I
would picture that would lead to an broader perception of security involvement is redtape. I think the grassroots or heightened awareness is a better route. 0D\EHLW¶V
something as simple as the PM asking is this important enough to protect ± RNOHW¶VEULQJ
in a resource to help protect it. Start bringing metrics together that show what is the cost
of losing this work (whether intellectual property, re-work involved in breach) and get the
project team to want to protect this project instead of mandating it with
policies. Additionally, when you go more from the grass roots perspective, it becomes a
PXFKEHWWHUFROOHFWLYHNQRZOHGJHEDVHZLWKVWLOODIHZ³VHFXULW\H[SHUWV´ZKRDUHVWLOO
beyond the collective norms.

2.

As I understand it, in the environment you work in, you have multiple groups that deal
with cyber/virtual security and physical security in various ways. Would it make sense to
you as a project manager to combine both within your own project in order to mitigate
most security risks and improve your security posture?
I would imagine that would help. ,GRQ¶WFRPHIrom a strong security perspective, but
QRZLQP\UROH,¶PVXUURXQGHGE\LWDWZRUNDQGDOVRPDUULHGWRWKDW Because of this
new knowledge of all these threats surrounding the work we do, I place a much bigger
importance on it. ,NQRZWKDWRWKHU30VGRQ¶t have it as the same level of importance as
,QRZGREXWWKDW¶VRQO\EHFDXVHWKH\DUHXQDZDUHRIWKHVHULVNV Security is often an
afterthought or something people need to work in later, or perceived as red-tape. If we
were to work together and involve security from the beginning, I think that perception of
difficulty could be overcome.
- This seems similar to how quality was viewed in the past (or in some cases
still is). As an afterthought. For now it appears that the organization needs to provide the
mandate, and the funding, to have PM's conduct more security management. Security
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needs to be an integral part of project planning and execution. If a project has no need for
an extensive security management plan, then so be it, however chances are that PM's will
have to spend a few hours a week managing the security plan just like any other
knowledge area. This leads back to what I have discovered in my research regarding
information security governance (ISG). The idea that the CEO and the Board are just as
responsible for, and concerned about information security as the guy or gal in the cubicle
doing the day to day security work. It comes down to who is responsible. It seems in the
past CISO's were not directly tied into the executive level at organizations (or didn't even
exist), until bad things happened and governments started to regulate more. Do you have
any input on this? Do you think security management is similar to where quality
management was in the past? What is your perspective on the executive level in your
organization as far as security is concerned?
,FRPSOHWHO\DJUHHWKDWLW¶VOLNHTXDOLW\DQGWKHSURJUHVVZH¶YHPDGHZLWKWKDW
(SixSigma). ,WKLQNWKHSXEOLFSHUFHSWLRQKDVQ¶WPDGHLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\ DQGWRD
much less degrees physical security) a valuable enough asset to get outraged towards it
yet. 7KH³EDGWKLQJVKDSSHQLQJ´KDYHQ¶WEHHQDELJGHDOHQRXJKWKDWPDNHVSHRSOH
UHDOL]HWKDWLW¶VDOORXUUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV\HW Example, we constantly hear where your data
has once again been breached. :H DVDVRFLHW\ GRHVQ¶WUHDOO\FDUHDERXWWKHIROORZ-up
RIZKDW¶VEHLQJGRQHWRVWRSWKLVIURPKDSSHQLQJEXWUDWKHUMXVWFRQWDFW\RXUEDQNRUDQ
identity protection service and put on the personal band-aid and continue on with
life. PCI regulations are fairly new, and they are a very positive addition to mandating
security practices into a diverse market. There certainly have been some industries that
have successfully incorporated a security posture into their field (changes in airport
security since 9/11/01), but with so much digital data being generated, many industries
FDQ¶WHYHQIDWKRPZKDWFRXOGKDSSHQ
0\SHUVSHFWLYHRQH[HFXWLYHOHYHOLQYROYHPHQWZLWKWKHVHFXULW\DVDZKROHLVQ¶WWRR
high, at least here at Purdue. At the moment, I think we are fairly immature with our risk
& security management. The model you mention is a much more proactive stance than
we have.
3.

In general, do you consider security (cyber and physical) falling within the realm of risk
management, or some other area of management (perhaps a separate and unique
management knowledge area)?
I see security as part of risk management. :KLOHLW¶VPRVWFRPPRQO\IRFXVHGRQ
standard items such as acceptable, scope, or resourcing, I think the loss of your
intellectual property through other mechanisms other than losing a resource is just as
PXFKDVDULVN,¶YHQHYHUZULWWHQWKLVLQDULVNUHJLVWHUEXWRQHFRXOGFRQFHLYHRID
cyber-DWWDFNRQWKHQHWZRUNLQIUDVWUXFWXUH VLQFHLW¶VUHDOO\MXVW-5 locations around the
world) that could bring many projects to a screeching halt.
- It seems that all professionals I've talked to agree with you that it is risk
management. That is good information for me. Just to expand on this, what if you had
some security management framework, including accepted standard templates, that you
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could use to build a plan under risk management? You could add something to the risk
register stating "see security management plan", and anyone could immediately reference
the managed security risks based on your specific situation. I can imagine there will be
some projects where the plan is quite minimal (in cases where the organization takes
most of the security responsibility for example), and others that are very large and
extensive. It all depends on the project scope etc. What do you think?
Certainly beneficial. I can picture it trying to establish what is needed to adequately
incorporate security. What is trying to be secured? Similar to a risk register, what could
be incorporated, cost of damage, long-WHUPVHFXULW\PDLQWHQDQFH«

4.

Do you have any hard numbers on security expenditures, both in management and
employee actions (money, effort), for projects you have managed in the past or are
managing now? I am looking for some general percentage based numbers that will let me
build a valid model (ex. 5% of budget spent directly on security measures, or 10 hours a
week spent on security management tasks).
,GRQ¶WKDYHWKLVW\SHRILQIRUPDWLRQYHU\UDUely do we quantify our expenses as security
specific.
- Fair enough, this seems consistent with most people I talk to. If you do spend
on security, how is security funded? Through operational expenses? Has there ever been
a case where you had someone charge hours to security specific tasks on a contract or
project, or employed someone exclusively for dealing with information security tasks?
Would that even be necessary in your opinion? I do believe this would be a great metric
to track at all levels of an organization.
Purdue IT finally started formalizing our Portfolio and it is a work in progress on
improving how security tasks early on are charged back. Very often my team (the
security experts) are involved in the very beginning of a project (reviewing contracts,
FORXGVHUYLFHVVHFXULW\SURILOHV  FORVHUWRWKHHQGZKHQLW¶VFORVHUWR³JR-OLYH´ SHQ
WHVWLQJYXOQHUDELOLW\VFDQQLQJ«  We are now able to track our hours spent towards
WKHVHRWKHUSURMHFWVZKLFKDUHQ¶WVHFXULW\IRFXVHGDt all. Down the road, once we mature
the model a bit, it would be nice to look ahead and predict that certain IT resources will
be involved at different times and plan for that. 5LJKWQRZZH¶UHVWLOOFORVHUWRMXVW
getting a more realistic perspective of where time is going.
I appreciate your time and the opportunity to speak to you on this topic.
Thank You,
Robert
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We have 5 or 6 people we "rescued" from startups, where they were being worked to
death. They were attracted more by the security of a larger company willing to stand
behind the project for more than 6 months, and we haven't really pressed people into
overtime the way startups do. But we haven't offered any of them significant stock, so
they probably wouldn't do it for very long if we tried to.
The interesting thing to me as that so many companies realize that their "normal" way of
launching projects has low success rates, so they need to "break the mold" and do
something different. I suspect a lot of this is also driven by the idea of potentially
spinning off the project as another company, or selling it off. By separating it this way, it
could continue to function with no huge staff shakeup.
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 12:22 PM, Robert Bott <rbott@purdue.edu> wrote:
That is quite the complicated answer, but very good answer for me to use. I have been
reading a lot about and talking to people about large companies treating new ideas just
like startups, with the same processes and semi-separate from the rest of the organization.
That seems to be the model that works for these times. I wonder if they also provide the
employees who work on these internal startups the same stock options and opportunities
WRRZQDSLHFHRIWKHSLHMXVWOLNHUHDO´VWDUWXSV,FDQ¶WWKLQNRIDQ\WKLQJWKDWZRXOG
PRWLYDWHDQLQGLYLGXDOWRZRUNKDUGIRUWKLVNLQGRIRSSRUWXQLW\,QFHQWLYHVPDWWHU«

From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 1:04 PM
To: Robert Bott
Subject: Re: Research Question Responses
I'm fine with the consent form as long you don't publish my name or company. :-)
Company wide, we're very functional: Sales, Marketing, Engineering, Support. There are
also cross-cutting concerns (Accounting, Operations, ... )
Within engineering, we're project focussed for the most part, but there are 3 or 4 of us
that answer directly to the the VP of engineering instead of the project manager. Sort of
"staff level engineer" that float between projects as needed, although we all have different
titles. The rest of the engineers stay on the particular project they were hired in on, unless
that project ends, or a new project starts up and siphons people off their old project.
The actual project I'm on has been treated very differently. We're acting like a startup
within the company. We have our own product manager, or own executive officer, our
own marketing team, etc. The only place we plug into the rest of the company is in
accounting, where we use the same backend systems, and a bit of IT.
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So there's a complicated answer for you.
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 8:02 AM, Robert Bott <rbott@purdue.edu> wrote:
<REDACTED>,
,ZDQWHGWRPDNHVXUH\RXDUH2.ZLWKWKHFRQVHQWIRUP<RXGRQ¶WKDYHWRSULQWLWRXWLI
you do not want, I simply wanted to know if you had any questions or concerns.
Also, I had another small follow up for you. How would you best describe the
organizational structure of your company? Functional, Matrix or Projectized (see
PMBOK p. 22)?
Thanks,
Robert

From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 5:03 PM
To: Robert Bott
Subject: Re: Research Question Responses
information/assets - high. Unless there's some unkown bug associated with VPN that
hasn't become publicly known.
our product - high. Unless there's some inherent bug in Amazon's VPC implementation
that hasn't become publicly known.

On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 4:04 PM, Robert Bott <rbott@purdue.edu> wrote:
<REDACTED>,
I have one more general question for you.
How effective do you believe your security controls are in keeping your
information/assets secure during development. Also, how do you rate the security of your
product? Perhaps a simple scale of low, medium and high would suffice, though you may
of course elaborate.
Thanks,
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Robert

From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 1:01 PM
To: Robert Bott
Subject: Re: Research Question Responses
IT owns Stash (the physical servers) and the overall administration of those servers. We
have no person designated as IT within our group. We answer to the VP of engineering,
IT answers to the CEO.
But we have a "group", and I have administrative privileges within the group to set who
can access our Stash Repos, and to create / delete repositories within our group. Other
project managers have there own group.
On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 11:56 AM, Robert Bott <rbott@purdue.edu> wrote:
Which level of IT owns the security on Stash? Is it just your team, or is it higher level IT?
<HS,ZRQ¶WPHQWLRQDQ\WKLQJLQWKHSDSHU,VLPSO\QHHG\RXUJHQHUDOLPSUHVVLRQV
articulated. The details are good for me to understand what you are doing. It seems like a
well-oiled machine.
From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 12:53 PM
To: Robert Bott
Subject: Re: Research Question Responses
When I was at Nokia, a competitor had paid a local private eye to dumpster-dive us
looking for what we were up to. Crazy but true.
Our proprietary code is stored in Stash (a git-based system). So people are constantly
pushing branches to Stash. IT owns the security of Stash. We are doing continuous
integration and deployement... Bamboo takes whatever is merged onto the "develop"
branch and builds it, then pushes is to our integration environment in AWS. Every
tuesday, we merge what's on develop to "master" branch, which gets pushed to our
staging environment. (Each AWS environment is it's own virtual private cloud, with it's
own domain name, databases, etc.) We run our internal team communication team (it's
called <REDACTED>... similar to HipChat or Slack) on staging all day, and on Thursday
we roll what's in staging to our production environment, which is where our customers
connect.
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<REDACTED> is open source in github (look for <REDACTED>). We're also offering
it as a new hosted service for companies to use. (Because Slack and HipChat are so
popular). It could be the product we pivot to if it becomes super successful.

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 11:43 AM, Robert Bott <rbott@purdue.edu> wrote:
Project assets as far as information, which you seem to have good policies and practices
to protect. It seems to me you ARE doing project security management and you have a
strong security posture overall. Remembering to erase whiteboards, as trivial as that
might sound, is a practice that is part of information security management, although not
over electrons of course.
I am guessing when you all write new code locally (which is an asset), it is stored on your
local machines and then certain builds transferred securely to repositories. I am guessing
your IT folks handle all the details of keeping this secure on local desktops and servers. If
not, this would be an issue your local managers would have to deal with. Maybe there is a
special need at your HSV location that requires extra attention security wise, maybe not.
Who better to know the environment the project operates in than the project manager and
his/her team? Managing this possible security concern might be as simple as getting
corporate IT to run down to your location, assess and implement controls. I would
suggest that the point is that someone is thinking about these risks, in this particular
scenario. Would you not agree?
7KLVLVUHDOO\JRRGVWXIIDQGVRPHWKLQJZHOOZRUWKPHQWLRQLQJLQP\ZRUN,GRQ¶WPHDQ
to suggest that there is always a need for specific management of security at the lowest
level, just that in some cases it will benefit everyone and should be considered. It all
comes at a cost though, so I am trying to gather information on the relationship between
cost and effectiveness.
Robert

From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 11:56 AM
To: Robert Bott
Subject: Re: Research Question Responses
"...do you think that project managers who assist in managing security could produce
safer project assets..."
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So in my current case, the "project assets" needs definition. I'm not sure if you're thinking
of things like a project plan (staffing, budget, design documents, etc.) or are you talking
about the end product itself?
In my case, it's really interesting. All of our documents (requirements, design, lessons
learned, test plans) are captured on an internal wiki. This wiki is editable by the entire
team. There are sections that a product manager is responsible for (the guy defining the
requirements) and parts that are owned by the project manager (the guy managing the
engineering team). We're a distributed company, so of course we support VPN access to
our network. But the security of our company network is totally in the hands of IT.
For our whiteboard notes, and especially for our hardware lab (which is a big open area),
we don't allow visitors to have cameras. And (because we have training classes for our
open source project, with international visitors come to) we're good about erasing white
boards before outside visitors are given a tour.
For sensitive paper documents, we have burn bins. Like every contractor in town, we rely
on an outside contractor to collect and destroy the trash placed in these. (Which I think is
a bit ridiculous, but I guess you can trust them as much as you'd trust a low-level hourly
janitorial staff member to do it.)
So that covers "project assets" assuming you mean guidance documents. Now for our
cloud service, we have all of our backend source code (which is proprietary) running in
AWS. For some of our services, Amazon is (or soon will be) a competitor. So there's a
huge amount of trust that they won't snatch and grab our source code. AWS is a huge part
of Amazon's revenue... it's actually what puts them in the black... so it's in their best
interest to not violate trust.
- <REDACTED>

On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 8:09 AM, Robert Bott <rbott@purdue.edu> wrote:
<REDACTED>,
To clarify:
Question 3:
In this case, information security regarding valuable information your project managers
need and use daily to complete their projects. Anything that is a trade secret or critical for
an organization that is being managed/created/used by a project. For example, if I were
building a new weapons system, I would want to keep any information secure throughout
the project life cycle (and beyond of course, but I am focused on project life cycles).
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There are many reports of Chinese cyber warriors stealing information on the F35 and
RWKHUSODWIRUPV,IWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQZDVVWROHQGXULQJWKHSURJUDP¶VOLIHF\FOHWKHQRQH
can assume that the final product is less secure (historical evidence exists of this). We do
not know what they know, so in potential future battles, the F35 might be countered to a
point of being ineffective.
Project security management is not a fully defined concept. There is little literature on
this idea. Basically, it is pushing some of the responsibility of security management,
under risk management, to the project manager. This includes all security, though I am
focused on information security for my thesis to manage the scope. Think of it in terms of
quality management, just for security.
So my question was meant to be viewed in this context. Looking back at all of your
experiences in contracting and private industry, do you think that project managers who
assist in managing security could produce safer project assets during the life cycle and
VDIHSURGXFWVDWFRPSOHWLRQ",IZHSXVKPRUHUHVSRQVLELOLW\LQVHFXULW\WRWKH³ORZHVW
OHYHO´RIPDQDJHPHQWLH30¶VFRXOGWKLVLQFUHDVHWKHVHFXULW\SRVWXUHRIWKHVHSURMHFWV
and the organization as a whole?
Sorry for being so long winded. I felt like I owed you a good explanation.
Robert
From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Tuesday, February 10, 2015 3:45 PM
To: Robert B
Subject: Research Question Responses
OK... so here goes.
·
Do you think project managers who manage security, including information
security, for their project above and beyond what the organization mandates (assuming
vulnerabilities have been considered and a threat assessment made) add to the security
posture of the organization? Do you have any examples from past or current projects
where you or others have done this, or similar management?
Yes. Our company provides both hardware and software products, as well as maintains a
widely used open source software project. More recently we've added cloud-based
services to our offerings. The mandates that exist are very different based on what a team
is doing. Hardware products have all manner of government and industry mandated
requirements. Our open source project, on the other hand, is guided more by community
peer review than anything else, and the emphasis is more on end-user privacy (a common
theme in open-source software).
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Our cloud-based services are relatively new, so there isn't much precedence in the
company to lean on. The project manager and system architect are responsible for
ensuring that industry best-practices are followed, and (for international customers)
regional law is being followed.
Security breeches in either our hardware devices (which are often connected to the
internet) and our cloud based services would be economically devastating.
·

Would you consider information security management a part of risk management?

Yes. But a formal risk assessment plan seems to be a relic of the past. I think the general
trend is "fail at security at your own peril". It's as much of a concern as gaining sufficient
market share to be successful. If you look at in the context of acquiring / retaining
customers, it's as important as what features you provide, your marketing campaign, etc.
You can do everything right, but a security failure can damage your brand irreparably.
·
Do you think that project security management, in particular looking at information
security, could lead to more secure project assets and products?
I suppose so. But you might want to define what you mean by information security and
information security management. Are you talking about customer credit card numbers
and other private information of a customer? Our employee contact list? Securing our
email server?
Our business and accounting systems (including things like email servers, Salesforce, our
accounting systems, etc.) are managed by our IT department. The security built into our
products and services, on the other hand, are the concern of the engineering teams that
design them. The projects I've worked on delineate the security concerns just as we do
any "feature" of our system. For example, we have specific tasks defined to design how
authentication is handled, how customer logs are handled, how and where encryption is
applied, etc. It's impossible, in my opinion, to break out security from the overall design
of the system. Just as we design the system to be scalable, or support a certain required
throughput, we also design in security.
·
How does your organization handle information security, in particular for projects?
How are you organized, who is responsible for what tasks? In general, what technology
do you use (does not have to be specific), how do you deal with human factors (ex.
training) and what policies and practices are there in your organization regarding
information security?
Refer to previous response for a lot of this. As I said, the project manager and system
architect are responsible for the engineering team's product design, which includes
security. Additionally:
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> We use public key certificates to secure access to cloud APIs. (All of our APIs are
encrypted, whether over HTTPS, websockets, or media frames using DTLS)
> We only expose servers that provide public APIs to the Internet. Our backend cloud
servers run in a VPC which otherwise only see traffic to/from other servers within the
VPC.
> We use Amazon security groups to further restrict ports, and access from the VPC back
to our corporate network.
·
Do you have any hard numbers of budget expenditures for information security and
its effectiveness (ROI perhaps)? Any percentage numbers of information security
expenditures per budget for projects would help. (If you do and it is propriety/secret
information you don't have to divulge it of course - this is understandably the most
difficult information to obtain)
The only thing that would appear outside of our normal engineering budget is we
periodically hire external security consultants to do white hat attempts to breech our
system. We provide them with a diagram of our architecture (major functional
components, where public APIs are exposed, the technologies used to communicate
among our backend servers, etc), which is more than we'd expect a random hacker to
know. Essentially we give them as much information from an attacker viewpoint as only
a current or former employee would have. I don't know the budget for this. We do it
when there's significant architectural change to merit it.
Hope this helps! I'd prefer you keep my name / company name out of the paper.
- <REDACTED>
From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2015 9:17 AM
To: Robert Bott
Subject: RE: Thesis Research
1) Do you think project managers who manage information security for their
projects above and beyond what the organization mandates add to the security
posture of the organization? Do you have any examples from past or current
projects where you or others have done this?
a. I think if agile teams or projects had more of a thought or leaning towards
VHFXULW\WKDWWKLVZRXOGFUHDWHDEHWWHUSURGXFWEXWLW¶VDPDWWHURIWLPH
and resources. 2QQRSURMHFW,¶PFXUUHQWO\ZRUNLQJRQGRZHKDYHDQ\
security experts at the team or project level. As you stated below, security
and vulnerability assessments are normally conducted by an independent
group of staff and usually after a product is at least into a systems
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integration environment or just prior to putting it into production. I agree,
that if you had a security minded person testing at the development level
IRUVHFXULW\LVVXHV\RX¶GFDWFKDORWPRUH Also, if teams were looking at
their coding (as developers) with more a mind to current security
vulnerabilities, they code would be safer. I think one way to do this is to
do more periodic training in security vulnerabilities.
b. I think another reason why a lot of government or company development
WHDPVGRQ¶WIRFXVRQVHFXULW\LVWKDWWKH\DVVXPHWKDWWKHQHWZRUNRU
firewalls in place will protect the software. ,QVWHDGRI³KDUGHQLQJ
HYHU\ZKHUH´WKH\VLPSO\DVVXPHWKDWWKHRXWHUFDVWOHZDOOZLOOVWRSWKH
DWWDFNDQGWKXVGRQ¶WSODQWRGHIHQGDQ\ZKHUHHOVH
2) Would you consider information security management a part of risk management?
a. I would. If I can mitigate the information security risk, then my overall
risk profile decreases.
3) Do you think that project security management, in particular looking at
information security, could lead to more secure project assets and products? What
is your opinion?
a. I think that projects looking at information security would lead to more
VHFXULW\V\VWHPVEXW,WKLQNLW¶VDPDWWHURIHQIRUFHPHQWV Continuous
Integration processes and DevOps tools have to be built in early so that
these security, static code analysis, and other vulnerability finding
applications/tools can be leveraged within the development process early
DVDUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ«DWWKHQLJKWO\EXLOGDIWHUHYHU\RQH
commits). These security scans and issues that the tools find have to also
be addressed within each team and sprint. Running the tool but not taking
any action on the SQL injection or other issues you find does not do you
any good. <RX¶YHJRWWRSODQWRKDYHWKHWHDPPHPEHUVDQGIXQGLQJWR
have these tools, keep them running, and also address security concerns.
4) How does your organization handle information security, in particular for
projects? How are you organized, who is responsible for what tasks? In general,
what technology do you use (does not have to be specific), how do you deal with
human factors (ex. training) and what policies and practices are there in your
organization?
a. ,QJHQHUDOZH¶YHJRWDQ$UFKLWHFWXUH (QJLQHHULQJWHDPWKDWDGGUHVVHV
the larger program/system issues & planning. Also, we have an ISSM and
,662ZKRLVVXSSRVHGWRZRUU\DERXWRXUVHFXULW\FRQFHUQV«EXWWKLVLV
really only at the permissions/access level for system access. There is not
anyone within the projects or systems who is worried about information
security. There are teams within our client who do white hat hacking and
RWKHUVHFXULW\DWWDFNVRIWKHV\VWHP«EXWWKHVHDUHQRUPDOO\SRVW
Production.
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b. Within our development environment we use automated testing tools
(Selenium for example) and some static code analysis tools and other CI
tools that we bolt onto our builds and check ins (SonarQ for
example). The training for information security is generic and mainly
address PII and not handing someone your ID card and pin number.
5) Do you have any hard numbers of budget expenditures for information security
and its effectiveness (ROI perhaps)? Any percentage numbers of information
security expenditures per budget for projects would help. (If you do and it is
propriety/secret information you don't have to divulge it of course - this is
understandably the most difficult information to obtain)
a. ,GRQ¶WKDYHDQ\LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKDWIRURXUFOLHQW ,W¶VVRUHPRYHGIURP
our development teams that I never hear this discussed.

Respectfully,
<REDACTED>
ACE Agile Development, <REDACTED>
SEACATS Agile Development, <REDACTED>
<REDACTED>

Robert,
Please let me know if I missed anything between both of your e-mails. I answered your additional
questions in relation to the original 3 and 4, and left your new questions in blue font color as they
were not numbered.

3) Do you think that project security management, in particular looking at information
security, could lead to more secure project assets and products?
Yes. Managers need to ensure the products they delivering have security as part of the
internal control and acceptance criteria. For example, it is not enough to produce a web
DSSOLFDWLRQZKLFKPHHWVDOORIWKHFXVWRPHU¶VUHTXHVWHGIXQFWLRQDOIHDWXUHV$SSOLFDWLRQ
developers should also have information security built in as part of their routine
development lifecycle. The application team should routinely scan both their static code
and compiled code for security and quality issues. There are numerous open source and
commercial tools to assist with both (e.g., PMD, HP WebInspect / Fortify). Similar to the
applications, the entire technology stack itself should be treated similarly (e.g., Nessus
scans, AppDetective). Depending on the industry, there are further requirements which
need to be taken into consideration such as HIPPA, Section 508 Compliance, etc.
Furthermore, the overall Risk Management process should be looking at far more than
just information security as other risks can have ripple effects. In the event there is an
unplanned resource issue (i.e., risk was not properly identified and became an issue)
then one of the items/areas which may suffer is the overall quality or security of the
product ± this falls under the triple constraint concept.
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4) How does your organization handle information security, in particular for projects?
We adhere to FISMA requirements which have guided implementations through a combination of
mandated standards (i.e., Federal Information Processing Standards), NIST Special Publications,
and FISCAM specified controls when dealing with financial information. Every project is managed
differently and while some projects managers may not go above and beyond, others will not only
be required to take the additional steps but will be closely monitored for resolution. A common
example is when a critical vulnerability is published and government agencies are required to
report on their respective compliance state with the resolution (e.g., heartbleed vulnerability).
During these times it is not an option for a project manager to accept the as-is security posture,
and while they may not get additional funding or resources for the resolution, the outcome is still
the same ± they are required to resolve the issue. Taking into consideration the triple constraint,
this may result in delayed project completion, or reduced quality in the final delivered product.

Further questions:
Are you familiar with the 20 Critical Security Controls published and maintained by the
Council on Cyber Security (and championed by SANS)? If so, what is your opinion on
these controls and the means by which they are supposed to be implemented. Also, how
do you think they relate to the NIST 800-53rev4 and the ISO 27002 standards (as related
to information security)?
The Top 20 CSC has a greater focus on metrics and validation approaches which other
requirements such as NIST 800-53 do not include. The Top 20 CSC include specific
PHWULFVVXFKDV³+RZORQJGRHVLWWDNHWRGHWHFWQHZGHYLFHVDGGHGWRWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
network (time in minutes)?´ZKHUHDV1,67-53a does not have such specific metrics
to assess/determine level of efficiency the NIST 800-53 controls.
For example: NIST 800-53 rev4, controls for High watermark systems have CM-8 (3)
and SI-4 (4)(5) will cover most of CSC 1, however if you were to examine the test
procedures for the NIST controls per 800-53a rev1, the tester or auditor only needs to
ensure the basic elements of the control are place and not necessarily the true
effectiveness (e.g., time in minutes to detect/alert/isolate unauthorized network assets).
CSC 1-6 speaks to the implementation of a NAC solution to monitor unauthorized
systems and to move the system to a specific virtual LAN in the event of an attack.
Unfortunately, IR-4(2) is not required per NIST for High systems, although if
successfully implemented would address a NAC-like approach.
How would you best describe the organizational structure of your company? Functional,
Matrix or Projectized (see PMBOK p. 22)?
The vast majority of the organization is functional, with few instances of matrix.
<REDACTED>
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From: Robert Bott [mailto:rbott@purdue.edu]
Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 9:00 AM
To: <REDACTED>
Subject: RE: Assistance/Input Requested

<REDACTED>
I had another small follow up for you, on top of the others I sent you a few days back.
Hopefully, these will be the last!
How would you best describe the organizational structure of your company? Functional,
Matrix or Projectized (see PMBOK p. 22)?
Thanks,
Robert

From: <REDACTED>. [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2015 5:38 PM
To: Robert Bott; <REDACTED>
Subject: RE: Assistance/Input Requested
Robert,
Thank you that answers my questions and concerns. What is your timeframe for being able to
utilize our responses? The below can be considered an interim response in the event you need
something soon, but ultimately would like to re-read my own answers and make repeated
changes to an unhealthy extent (e.g., question 5) before you consider them as a final set of
answers. Also, please let me know if you need anything else to increase validity.
Subject 1
Certifications:
x Project Management Professional (PMP)
x Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP)
x Certified Authorization Professional (CAP)
x Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
x Certified Information Security Manager (CISM)
x Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control (CRISC)
x Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)
x Certified Hacking Forensic Investigator (CHFI)
x Certified Penetration Tester (CPT)
x Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR)
x Certified Scrum Master
x Certified Scrum Product Owner
x Information Technology Library Infrastructure (ITIL): Service Offerings & Agreements
x Information Technology Library Infrastructure (ITIL): Service Design
x Information Technology Library Infrastructure (ITIL): Foundations version 3
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Note: The potential responses to these questions will inherently vary depending on the person
being interviewed. I will be answering from my personal perspective and do not officially
represent the U.S. federal government.
1) Do you think project managers who manage information security for their projects
above and beyond what the organization mandates add to the security posture of the
organization?
This depends on a few factors, such as the cost of the measure to implement, the cost of
the measure once implemented, and the overall risk appetite of the organization.
For example, if an organization requires users to maintain an 8 character password which
is changed only once a year, then in most cases the cost to change the requirements to
14 character passwords to be changed every 90 days, then the organization most likely
observe an increased call volume to the help desk for forgotten passwords. The cost to
implement is low, and the cost to maintain is high.
On the other hand, there are potential situations where an organization may not require
their technical teams to encrypt data at rest or use a Public Key Infrastructure to protect
data in transit. These two types of common data protection measures can be
implemented with minimal costs and little to no increase in post-implementation support.
Do you have any examples from past or current projects where you or others have done
this?
Yes. Several years ago I worked as a contractor for a federal client. The task we were
given was to improve the overall FISMA score. At the time, there was a process which
ZRXOGDOORZIRUWKHV\VWHP¶VVFRUHWRVKRZDOHYHORIFRPSOLDQFHZLWKVHFXULW\FRQWUROV
even though the controls were not in place. This is due to the fact that the scoring
process accepted properly documented and authorized exceptions to required security
controls (i.e., Risk Acceptance). There was an approved exception to using TN3270 (IBM
Mainframe client connection). The organization utilized certificates to establish secure
connections (SSL at the time) on other information systems. We utilized their existing
certificate issuance and management process and had the TN3270 sessions invoked
through pre-established SSL connections. This was transparent to the users, did not
improve their FISMA score, but greatly improved the security for their data in transit.
2) Would you consider information security management a part of risk management?
Both information security management and risk management are included in most major
information technology lifecycle frameworks (e.g., National Institute of Standards and
Technology Special Publication 800-37, ISO/IEC 16085:2006). The Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-130, Appendix III requires adequate security to be
implemented for federal information systems, at a degree commensurate with the risk
DQGPDJQLWXGHRIKDUPLIWKHV\VWHP¶VFRQILGHQWLDOLW\DYDLODELOLW\RULQWHJULW\ZHUH
compromised. In short, there are costs associated with implementing security controls,
and that cost should be weighed against the resulting impact of the risk.
3) Do you think that project security management, in particular looking at information
security, could lead to more secure project assets and products?
Yes.
What is your opinion?
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The organization should adopt an existing and mature lifecycle framework which is best
aligned to the organizations legal and business needs in relation to information security.
4) How does your organization handle information security, in particular for projects?
We adhere to FISMA requirements which have guided implementations through a
combination of mandated standards (i.e., Federal Information Processing Standards ),
NIST Special Publications, and FISCAM specified controls when dealing with financial
information.
How are you organized, who is responsible for what tasks?

(Reference redacted email

content (NIST, 2005))
³There are formal designations identified within FISMA and FISCAM, which map to
several key roles, each with differing responsibility. Please refer NIST Special Publication
800-65 for more information on the following roles, to include additional roles not
mentioned herein.
Senior Agency Officials
Senior agency officials provide information security for the information and information
systems that support the operations and assets under their control, under the direction of
the head of the agency. Delegating to the agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) the
authority to ensure compliance with agency security requirements
Chief Information Officer
The Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (also known as the
Clinger-Cohen Act) requires agencies to appoint CIOs. The agency CIO is the senior IT
advisor to the Investment Review Board and the head of the agency. Develops and
maintains risk-based information security policies, procedures, and control techniques.
Ensures IT training for agency staff and oversees IT security personnel. Designates a
senior agency information security officer to carry out CIO directives as required by
FISMA.
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
As mandated by FISMA, the senior agency information security officer is appointed by
the CIO and manages information security throughout the agency. The senior agency
information security officer is responsible for coordinating program requirements
throughout the agency with designated points of contact and project managers.
System Owner
The system owner handles the day-to-day management of the IT investment. The system
owner responsibilities include the following:
x

Maintaining active senior-level involvement throughout the development of the
system;

x
x
x

Participating in project review activities and reviewing project deliverables;
Coordinating activities with senior management;
ObtaLQLQJDQGPDQDJLQJWKHEXGJHWWKURXJKRXWWKHSURMHFW¶VOLIHF\FOHDJDLQVWD
SURMHFWPDQDJHU¶VGHOLYHUHGORFNHGEDVHOLQH
Holding review and approval authority to ensure that developed products incorporate
security and meet user requirements;

x
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x

Ensuring system has an up-to-date security plan, has a contingency plan, and
receives full C&A;

x

Providing baseline assessment performance measures to evaluate the security of the
delivered IT initiative; and,

x

Developing and maintaining system-specific POA&Ms.

Information System Security Officer
The Information System Security Officer is a direct report to the System Owner and
assists in carrying out the responsibilities. However, the System Owner retains the
accountability for tKHLQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHP¶VVHFXULW\SRVWXUH7KHUHPD\EHPXOWLSOH
Information System Security Officers for each information system, however there is only
one assigned System Owner.´ S± 22)
In general, what technology do you use (does not have to be specific), how do you deal
with human factors (ex. training) and what policies and practices are there in your
organization?
Microsoft Windows for most desktops, and iOS/Android for most smartphones. We utilize
common commercial products to enforce configuration and security policies on all
devices. We also use common commercial solutions for web servers (e.g., Apache, IIS,
WebSEAL), application servers (e.g., WebSphere, WebLogic, Tomcat) and databases
(e.g., Oracle, SQL, DB2, Datacom). The policies and practices in place are largely
governed and derived through federal mandates from the Office of Management and
Budget (e.g., OMB A-130 and OMB A-123), and Homeland Security Presidential
Directives (e.g., HSPD-12). Note: Specific details on versions, and which products are
used to secure these systems are intentionally excluded.
Training is provided to federal employees through a combination of computer based
training and classroom. Contractors are expected to arrive with the necessary skills and
experiences to fulfil their contracted duties. However, there are exceptions made
depending on the circumstance (e.g., training provided for a new product to be supported
by an existing contract team).
5) Do you have any hard numbers of budget expenditures for information security and its
effectiveness (ROI perhaps)?
There would not be a Return on Investment for most of our expenditures in relation to
implementing information security. Furthermore, security is typically implemented at a
cost to meet a legal requirement in the federal government opposed to experience a
financial return/gain. This is typically true for commercial organizations, with exception of
measures protecting trade secrets; of which is still difficult to estimate the ROI.
Instead, there are times where implementing commercial solutions for increasing security
or meeting a federal mandate may also result in an ongoing cost savings which at times
could map to a perpetual ROI. For example, 35% of our current Help Desk calls are
password reset (i.e., users forgetting passwords). We are in the process of implementing
Single Sign-On utilizing two-factor authentication through PIV cards. This will result in a
significant reduction in call volume as the cards utilize shorter character count PINs, that
are easier to remember. In addition, there is also a method for a user to reset their own
PIN by utilizing a fingerprint scanner. The result will enable the government to renegotiate
the existing Help Desk contract at a lower price due to a significant reduction in the
overall manpower necessary to provide their respective support services.
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Measuring effectiveness can depend on the unit within the organization. For example, a
robust cybersecurity program with highly engineered systems will likely have a reduced
active threat count and greater threat counter and resolution time compared to a less
advanced engineered program.
Any percentage numbers of information security expenditures per budget for projects
would help.
I am not aware of any specific amount of required funding dedicated to information
security (e.g., 15% of overall project), but will check with our budget teams.

<REDACTED>
From: Robert Bott [mailto:rbott@purdue.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2015 3:43 PM
To: <REDACTED>
Subject: RE: Assistance/Input Requested

Sir,
I can leave out your PII from my thesis for publication. The only thing I ask to publish is
your job title and any certifications you have in order to increase validity. I do not intend
WRPHQWLRQWKHQDPHRI\RXUHPSOR\HU RWKHUWKDQ³KLJKWHFKFRPSDQ\´³RUJRYHUQPHQW
DJHQF\´± very general) or your PII.
$QH[DPSOHZRXOGEH³6XEMHFW303HWF´LQWKHOLVWRISURIHVVLRQDOV,UHIHUHQFH7KHQ
,ZLOOXVH³6XEMHFW´DV\RXUUHIHUHQce when I refer to the information you might provide
me. I will publish the email conversations in Appendices and redact your PII and
company or agency name. I hope this answers your question. If you have any other
concerns, please let me know.
Respectfully,

Robert Bott
From: <REDACTED> [mailto: <REDACTED>]
Sent: Friday, March 06, 2015 10:06 AM
To: Robert Bott
Subject: Re: Assistance/Input Requested

Robert,
I would definitely like my PII and company name removed. My Title is Information
Systems Security Manager. I hold the following certifications
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·
·
·
·

Information Technology Library Infrastructure Foundations (ITIL)
Certified Information System Security Professional (CISSP)
ICAgile Certified Professional (ICP)
Certified Scrum Master (CSM)

Please feel free to ask as many questions as you would like. In addition to the
responses <REDACTED> provided, here are some additional points to your
questions from my perspective.
1) Do you think project managers who manage information security for their
projects above and beyond what the organization mandates add to the security
posture of the organization? Do you have any examples from past or current
projects where you or others have done this?
I see Project Managers as the face of the Project. They have to lead by example and
VWULYHWRPHHWRUH[FHHGWKHPLQLPXPRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VVHFXULW\UHTXLUHPHQWV Since they
are in a position to interface between stakeholders, business and engineers, I see their
value as trend setters.
As an example, I, along with my colleagues are also Team Leads that interface with
business, stakeholders, and engineers that implement the solution. We have witnessed
the organization setting minimum requirements for implementing IT security, such as
implementing a database with shared database administration account. As we dug deep
into the security posture, we discovered several deficiencies in the security of the
databases. One of the things that we did as change agents, was to help the customer
realize the weaknesses, and presented ideas on how to drastically improve it. In
summary, we went above the bare minimum, and implemented encrypted databases,
individual admin account for better auditing of administration responsibilities, enabling
role-based single sign-on using PIV cards to name a few.
Project managers definitely have to go above and beyond to improve the security posture
of the organization beyond the minimum requirements as they are considered change
agents.
2) Would you consider information security management a part of risk
management?
Absolutely. One of the key parts of the FISMA Score card is the risk factor which is
derived from the NIST SP 800-37. One of the most common issues we face is protecting
data in transit. In the digital age, almost all transactions are done electronically and that
data must be protected. Security Managers often struggle to implement the protection of
data in transit as this can be costly to implement. A perfect balance of cost and security
posture has to be maintained. The most common implementations are to enable SSL
encrypted communication channels secured by PKI certificates from valid CA Authority.
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3) Do you think that project security management, in particular looking at
information security, could lead to more secure project assets and products? What
is your opinion?
Absolutely. In addition, I feel that an industry standard approach should be used such as
CMMI or ISO to ensure correct processes and controls are implemented.
4) How does your organization handle information security, in particular for
projects? How are you organized, who is responsible for what tasks? In general,
what technology do you use (does not have to be specific), how do you deal with
human factors (ex. training) and what policies and practices are there in your
organization?
Same answer as <REDACTED>
5) Do you have any hard numbers of budget expenditures for information
security and its effectiveness (ROI perhaps)? Any percentage numbers of
information security expenditures per budget for projects would help. (If you do
and it is propriety/secret information you don't have to divulge it of course - this is
understandably the most difficult information to obtain)
In addition to <REDACTED> answer, I would like to add that the best Return On
Investment is the peace of mind that one can provide to protect the assets of their
Organization. Again the balance is to make information secure yet still usable by
consumers. Some of the previous companies I have worked for used as much as 35% 45% of their expenditures on security. This is of course dependent on the information
that needs to be protected and the value of the business.
-<REDACTED>
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Appendix B

Model Data

The following figures represents all data collected from each individuals run used
for this paper. It contains all detailed results for each model run.

Figure B.2 ± No Project CSCs

Figure B.3 ± One Project CSC
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Figure B.4 ± Two Project CSCs

Figure B.5 ± Three Project CSCs
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Figure B.6 ± Four Project CSCs

Figure B.7 ± Five Project CSCs
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Figure B.8 ± Five Project CSCs with CSC 18

130
Appendix C

CSC Selection Analysis

Critical Security Controls (CSCs) selected for model implementation. The
information in this appendix was used to help design and implement the model. It
consists of a description and analysis of the viability of selected CSCs for purposes of the
model as well as potential costs and effectiveness metrics. Most of the following
information referenced from (Council on Cyber Security, n.d.) and (Pruitt, 2013).

Critical Security Control #3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on
Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
Researcher Comments: Could be useful to model a lower level project with the need to
manage their own configurations due to a business need. For example, the organizational
level configuration standards are not strict, robust or effective enough for the specific
demands of the project.
Description:
Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the security
configuration of laptops, servers, and workstations using a rigorous configuration
management and change control process in order to prevent attackers from exploiting
vulnerable services and settings.
Type of control:
Policies, Practices & Procedures
Implementation method and estimated costs:
Implementation (partial):
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x
x
x
x
x

Establish and ensure the use of standard secure configurations for operating
systems
Implement automated patching for applications and operating systems
Limit administrative privileges to a very few knowledgeable people
Follow strict configuration management
Purchase securely configured systems from manufacturers when possible

Estimated costs:
The costs are associated with the time expenditure of labor and the costs of
purchasing well configured systems, as well as any tools used to manage configurations.
Model Abstract Cost: Percentage of total Budget (variable)
Effectiveness metrics:
x
x
x

Time taken to detect and report unauthorized configuration changes to administrators
Time taken to block/quarantine unauthorized configuration changes
Ability to physically locate system

Related attacks:
x

Attackers exploit weak default configurations of systems that are more geared to
ease of use than security

Critical Security Control #7: Wireless Access Control
Comments: Might be useful to model given that a project could be at a separate location
and/or isolated from higher organizational wireless infrastructure. There might be
specific situations where the PM needs to pay special attention to the access points
supporting his/her project.
Description:
The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct the security use of
wireless local area networks (LANS), access points, and wireless client systems.
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Type of control:
Technology; Policies, Practices & Procedures
Implementation method and estimated costs:
Implementation (partial):
x

x
x
x
x

Ensure each wireless device connected to the network matches and authorized
configuration and security profile and it is associated with an individual and
has a business need
Configure network scanning tools to detect wireless access points connected
to the wired network and ensure all wireless points are on approved lists
Use wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDS) to detect rogue wireless
devices
Ensure all wireless traffic uses the latest encryption and authentication
protocols
Disable all wireless services (peer-to-peer or bluetooth) unless a specific
business need exists

Estimated costs:
The costs are associated with the time expenditure of labor to deploy tools,
configure access points and administer/supervise scans. Also the cost of deployed tools
must be factored in.
Model Abstract Cost: Percentage of total Budget (variable)
Effectiveness metrics:
x
x
x
x
x

Are systems capable of detecting unauthorized wireless devices or access points?
How long does it take to generate alerts of unauthorized access?
How long does it take to block access of unauthorized devices?
Are additional alerts generated after the initial?
Is the system able to determine the physical location of the unauthorized device or
access point?
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Related attacks:
x

$WWDFNHUVH[SORLWZLUHOHVVDFFHVVSRLQWVWRJDLQHQWU\LQWRDWDUJHWRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
internal network, and exploit wireless client systems to steal sensitive information.

Critical Security Control #9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to
Fill Gaps
Comments: This should be modeled given that projects are unique and each has its own
vulnerabilities. PM's must ensure their team members are properly trained and educated
and have a security mindset. This is above and beyond what the organization dictates.
Description:
For all functional roles in the organization (prioritizing those mission--Ǧcritical to
the business and its security), identify the specific knowledge, skills, and abilities needed
to support defense of the enterprise; develop and execute an integrated plan to assess,
identify gaps, and remediate through policy, organizational planning, training, and
awareness programs.
Type of control:
Human Factors
Implementation method and estimated costs:
Implementation (partial):
x
x

x

Perform a gap analysis to judge security awareness and training level of
employees and build a baseline
Perform training to fill the gap and expand security awareness/skills. Use an
active and frequently updated online training program that focuses on the
major problems in security
Validate training through periodic testing of skills and training levels

Estimated costs:
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The costs are associated with the time expenditure of labor to training employees
and the loss of productivity of the trainees. Also, any initial costs to set up online training
either in-house or through

contracts must be considered as well as the continued

validation efforts.
Model Abstract Cost: Percentage of total Budget (variable)
Effectiveness metrics:
x
x
x

Participation rate of online training
Average scores of online training tests and periodic tests based on the baseline
Individual scores for mission-critical personnel

Related attacks:
x
x

Attackers exploit users and system administrators via social engineering scams that
work because of a lack of security skills and awareness
Attackers trick a user with an administrator-level account into opening a phishing
style e-PDLOZLWKDQDWWDFKPHQWRUVXUILQJWRWKHDWWDFNHU¶V content on an Internet
ZHEVLWHDOORZLQJWKHDWWDFNHU¶VPDOLFLRXVFRGHRUH[SORLWWRUXQRQWKHYLFWLP
machine with full administrator privileges

Critical Security Control #15: Controlled Access Based on Need to Know
Comments: Good to model since this ties in day to day management of the need to know
for team members. A plan must exist and must be managed that allows and retracts rights
to certain information as well as account types.
Description:
The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct secure access to
critical assets (e.g., information, resources, systems) according to the formal
determination of which persons, computers, and applications have a need and right to
access these critical assets based on an approved classification.
Type of control:
Technology; Policies, Practices & Procedures
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Implementation method and estimated costs:
Implementation (partial):
x
x
x

Locate all sensitive information and encrypt communications of it over less
trusted networks
Enforce audit logging of non-public information access
Segment the networks based on trust levels

Estimated costs:
The labor costs for setting up and managing the segmented networks as well as
the tools needed to encrypt information and log events.
Model Abstract Cost: Percentage of total Budget (variable)
Effectiveness metrics:
x
x

Can the system detect all attempts to access data that a user does not have
permissions to access?
Time taken to send an alert when non-privileged users attempt to access privileged
information

Related attacks:
x
x
x

Attackers gain access to sensitive documents in an organization that does not properly
identify and protect sensitive information or separate it from non-sensitive
information
Attackers compromise systems and alter important data, potentially jeopardizing
organizational effectiveness via polluted information
Attackers use malicious code to gain and maintain control of target machines, capture
sensitive data, and then spread it to other systems, sometimes wielding code that
disables or dodges signature-based anti-virus tools
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Critical Security Control #17: Data Protection
Comments: Might be good to model since specific situations might require better
encryption standards for the projects. Also, specific processes to access the data will
differ based on the project vs. the organizational level day to day operations.
Description:
The processes and tools used to prevent data exfiltration, mitigate the effects of
exfiltrated data, and ensure the privacy and integrity of sensitive information.
Type of control:
Technology; Policies, Practices & Procedures
Implementation method and estimated costs:
Implementation (partial):
x
x
x
x

Employ state-of-the-art encryption for data in transit and rest on all systems
handling sensitive information
Review cloud provider security practices for data protection
Employ tools to monitor network traffic and servers for sensitive information
Perform regular review of encryption algorithms and key lengths

Estimated costs:
The labor costs for managing the policies that are implemented and the continued
review of them, as well as the use of tools. The costs for any tools used.
Model Abstract Cost: Percentage of total Budget (variable)
Effectiveness metrics:
x
x
x

Does the system report on any violation of the set policies regarding encryption
and data transfer on the network?
Does the system store cryptographic key material properly?
Does the system report on data exfiltration attempts?
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x

Does the system generate appropriate reports and send them to administrators or
security personnel within accepted timeframes?

Related attacks:
x
x
x
x

Attackers use malicious code to gain and maintain control of target machines, capture
sensitive data, and then spread it to other systems, sometimes wielding code that
disables or dodges signature-based anti-virus tools
Attackers gain access to sensitive documents in an organization that does not properly
identify and protect sensitive information or separate it from non-sensitive
information
Attackers compromise systems and alter important data, potentially jeopardizing
organizational effectiveness via polluted information
Attackers gain access to internal enterprise systems and gather and exfiltrate sensitive
information without detection by the victim organization

Critical Security Control #18: Incident Response and Management
Comments: As far as the model, implementing this CSC might also demonstrate that
over time, a project that has its own incident response and management plan will become
a harder target vs. the other projects and the organization. The security posture of the
project that implements this CSC will be higher than other projects.
Description:
3URWHFWWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLQIRUPDWLRQDVZHOODVLWVUHSXWDWLRQE\GHYHORSLQJ
and implementing an incident response infrastructure (e.g., plans, defined roles, training,
communications, management oversight) for quickly discovering an attack and then
HIIHFWLYHO\FRQWDLQLQJWKHGDPDJHHUDGLFDWLQJWKHDWWDFNHU¶VSUHVHQFHDQGUHVWRULQJ the
integrity of the network and systems.
Type of control:
Human Factors; Policies, Practices & Procedures
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Implementation method and estimated costs:
Implementation (partial):
x
x
x
x
x

Ensure that there are written incident response plans that include roles and
responsibilities of personnel
Assign job descriptions and duties for handling incidents
Define management personnel who will take change and handle the incident
Devise standards for administrators to report anomalies and incidents to the
response team
Conduct regular incident scenario sessions (training) to ensure incident
personnel understand the latest threats and their roles in an incident

Estimated costs:
The labor costs for creating and managing the incident plans as well as the
required designation and training of personnel.
Model Abstract Cost: Percentage of total Budget (variable)
Effectiveness metrics:
x

None listed

Related attacks:
Attackers operate undiscovered in organizations without effective incident Ǧ
response capabilities, and when the attackers are discovered, the organizations often
FDQQRWSURSHUO\FRQWDLQWKHDWWDFNHUDGLFDWHWKHDWWDFNHU¶VSUHVHQFHRUUHFRYHUWRD
secure production state

